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Fair Use Old and New:
The Betamax Case and its Forebears
M. B. W. SINCLAIR*
INTRODUCTION
O N January 17, 1984, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.1
(Betamax), the first "fair use" decision the Court had ever handed
down.2 This Article examines the doctrine of fair use in American
copyright law from its judicial origins, through its statutory recog-
nition,3 to its interpretation in this landmark Supreme Court
decision.
Copyright is a legislatively created 4 bundle of rights in writ-
*Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana.
1. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Betamax], rev'g 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
2. Two fair use cases had previously been granted certiorari, but both had been af-
firmed without opinion by an equally divided Court. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aj'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's
Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v.
Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
3. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
4. "[T]he copyright is the creature of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the
power vested in the Congress. As this Court has repeatedly said, the Congress did not
sanction an existing right but created a new one." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127 (1932). The myth that copyright in the United States has an alternate basis in natural
law, that it is a natural right inhering in the author, has been thoroughly put to rest by
Professor Abrams. See Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. Rav. 1119 (1983).
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ings.5 The legislative power to control copyright in the United
States of America is granted to Congress in Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have the
power . .. [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries." ' Pursuant
to this power, in 1791 Congress enacted the first federal copyright
act,7 which has been revised periodically. The present statute, the
1976 Copyright Act, became effective on January 1, 1978.
The rights of the copyright owner are limited to those set
forth in the statute,8 presently enumerated in section 106 of the
1976 Copyright Act. The rights relevant here are those of engag-
ing in or authorizing (1) the reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords of, and (2) the preparation of derivative works based
upon, the copyrighted work.9 Sections 108 through 118 provide
specific exemptions10 from these rights. Section 107, the fair use
section, is the primary subject of this Article:
SEC. 107. LIMITATIONS ON ExcLusIvE RIGHTS: FAIR USE Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means speci-
fied by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."1
5. The word "writings" has always been broadly construed. See, e.g., section 102(a) of
the 1976 Copyright Act: "Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
8. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
10. L. SELTZER, ExEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 16-17 (1977).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
FAIR USE AFTER BETAMAX
This section is the first legislative recognition of fair use.12 Prior
to the 1976 Copyright Act, the doctrine had developed entirely at
the hands of judges, as an "equitable rule of reason.""3
Despite (or perhaps because of) 150 years of judicial develop-
ment, the doctrine of fair use has proved notoriously difficult to
define. Judge Learned Hand called it "the most troublesome [is-
sue] in the whole law of copyright . 14 Yet the need for the
doctrine has always been evident.
As Professor Kaplan has so vividly stated, the right to copy
seems fundamental to our society:
[I]f man has any "natural" rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his
fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown. Education, after all, pro-
ceeds from a kind of mimicry, and "progress," if it is not entirely an illusion,
depends on generous indulgence of copying.""
The clash of rights, goals, and ideals with which fair use must
cope is clear. On the one hand, there are the absolute rights
granted to copyright owners by Congress in section 106 of the
1976 Copyright Act pursuant to the Constitution's mandate. On
the other hand, there is the natural and necessary right to make
use of, to imitate, and to develop prior works. Mediating these
conflicting rights is the Constitution's prescribed goal: the promo-
tion of the progress of science.
Section I of this Article outlines the common law develop-
ment of the doctrine of fair use and examines various theories
that have been offered as an explanation of and justification for
the doctrine. The Section concludes by offering a fairly standard
theory which, it is claimed, adequately captures the judicial doc-
trine as developed through 1977. Section II is devoted to section
107, its legislative history, its language, and its treatment by
courts and commentators during the period beginning with its ef-
fective date and ending immediately prior to the Betamax decision.
It argues that Congress has indeed succeeded in capturing the
prior judicial doctrine, but only if the specific language of section
107 is properly construed. Section III outlines and analyzes the
12. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE
REPORT].
13. Id. at 62; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5689 [hereinafter cited as 1976 HOUSE REPORT].
14. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
15. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967).
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Betamax opinions in relation to the historical and statutory model
developed in the first two parts. The Section concludes with a dis-
cussion of possible legislative action in light of the Supreme
Court's decision.
I. THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE
Since 1790, the rights of the copyright owner have been spec-
ified by federal statute"8 enacted pursuant to the constitutional
copyright power."' Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright
Act, these statutes18 stated the copyright owner's rights specifically
and absolutely. For example, the first statute, enacted in 1790,
provided that the author or his assignee "shall have the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such
map, chart, book or books... ,,"I and the 1909 statute provided
that "[a]ny person entitled thereto .. .shall have the exclusive
right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copy-
righted work."' 20 This completeness of coverage and absoluteness
of rights is in accord with the constitutional mandate that the goal
of copyright be achieved "by securing. . . to authors. . . the ex-
clusive right to their .. .writings. ' 21 Nevertheless, it would be
absurd, for example, for the copyright law to prevent a reviewer
or critic from quoting a subject work.22 Indeed, prevention of
16. This is the enactment date of the first federal copyright statute. Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (1982)). Between 1783 and 1786 twelve states enacted copyright statutes. Those of two
states (Maryland and Pennsylvania), however, being expressly dependent upon all states
enacting such a law, never came into effect because of Delaware's failure to enact one. See
B. BUGHEE, GENEsIs OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 104-24 (1967).
In 1672, the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted the first American copyright law. Id. at
65-67. These laws were superseded by the federal statute.
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See also supra text accompanying note 6.
18. Congress has revised or amended the copyright statute whenever necessary. The
major revisions have been: Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch.
230, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat. 212-17; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; and the
present statute, Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
19. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. "[A] classic illustration of fair use is quoting from another's work in order to criti-
cize it." Wainright Secs. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
In 1960, Professor Latman noted that "there is apparently no reported American decision
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such uses of copyrighted works would tend to "stifle the very crea-
tivity which [the copyright] law is designed to foster. '23 But how,
in the face of the absolute exclusivity of the statutory right, is cop-
yright infringement to be avoided in such a use?
The equitable doctrine of fair use developed as a judicial re-
sponse to this question. Although the simple hypothetical case of
quoting for review presents few problems, as soon as one consid-
ers even small variations the application of the doctrine becomes
very difficult indeed.24 It is sometimes said that the doctrine is "so
flexible as virtually to defy definition" 25 and that it depends en-
tirely on the facts of the particular case.26
Nevertheless, fair use is often defined as: "[A] privilege in
others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted ma-
terial in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstand-
ing the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright.1 27 This
tells us very little as to when the question of fair use might appro-
priately be raised or, once raised, how it might be resolved; per-
haps this is the reason for its popularity. The nonconstructive
character of the definition is, however, hardly surprising when
one considers the very wide variety of art forms and circum-
stances to which fair use has been applied. In his 1961 report to
the House Judiciary Committee on copyright law revision, the
Register of Copyrights gave the following list as illustrative of fair
use:
involving alleged infringement in the course of serious criticism." STAFF OF SENATE SUB-
COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., 2D SESs., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 9 (Comm. Print 1960) (Study No. 14, Latman,
Fair Use of Copyrighted Works), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 5, 9 (Arthur Fisher
mem. ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works]. This remains
true today.
23. Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57,
60 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. See Dellar, 104 F.2d at 662.
25. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. "The cases emphasize that resolution of a fair use claim 'depends on an examina-
tion of the facts in each case [and] cannot be determined by resort to any arbitrary rules or
fixed criteria.'" Iowa State Univ., 621 F.2d at 60 (quoting Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)).
27. Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1068; Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1976). Note, Copyrights-'"Fair Use",
15 S. CAL. L. REV. 249 (1942); H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
260 (1944) (citing Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497);
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8176).
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quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work for
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article,
with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a por-
tion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a teacher
or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a
work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental and fortui-
tous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in the scene
of an event being reported. 8
It would be surprising indeed if the same rule or rules applied,
like litmus paper, to all these various circumstances. The picture is
further complicated by the variety of means technology provides
for using copyrighted work. Consider, for example, a sixty-second
television report of a band parade which includes fifteen seconds
of a copyrighted tune; this was held, properly, to be a fair use.29
But suppose the report was in a newspaper and included ten bars
of music: should the same rule apply?
The complex and diverse circumstances to which the doctrine
applies does not mean that fair use cannot be usefully defined8" or
that fair use decisions are necessarily ad hoc."1 A stable doctrine,
implemented through a set of intelligent and systematic guide-
lines, can be developed, but one should not demand of it more
specificity than is appropriate to the subject matter. Accordingly,
over time there have been many secondary works which have clas-
sified uses to which the doctrine applies and have mapped the log-
ical geography of those classifications. 2
As in much academic work, the quest is usually for a unified
28. REGISTrER OF COPYRIGHTS, HOUSE CoMMrrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW 24 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT]. This list is included in
the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act; see 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12,
at 61-62; 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 65.
29. Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
30. Cf Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. Cf Iowa State Univ., 621 F.2d at 57; Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
32. A representative list of sources prior to the 1976 Copyright Act (and the investiga-
tions leading thereto) would include: H. BALL, supra note 27, at 259-92; E. DRONE, THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTAL PRODUCTIONS, 386-99 (1879); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law
of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM (ASCAP) 43 (1955); Latman, supra note 22;
Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1954); and Note, supra note 27.
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source from which the diverse manifestations of the fair use doc-
trines can be derived. The question, however, "is not whether a
certain activity is . . . a 'fair use,' but whether, in an emerging
social and economic order, it ought to be. . . ."3 The problem of
fair use is in spelling out the content of the "ought"-for the
past, the present, and the future. This Section is addressed to the
historical perspective.
A. Partial Justifications of Fair Use
Among the justifications which have been offered for the doc-
trine of fair use are some that, while true to an extent, are analyti-
cally insufficient.
1. Implied Consent. It has sometimes been said that the doc-
trine of fair use can be based on the implied consent of the au-
thor.34 "The author of a copyrighted book invites reviews, com-
ments and criticism. And if his book deals with any of the
sciences, portions of it may be used by others in the same field as a
starting point for further development . . ... " The argument
has seldom been pushed very hard. It is implausible to say of a
plaintiff seeking redress for infringement that he consented to it.
Furthermore, use of the familiar "all rights reserved" notice de-
nying permission to use any of the work without express consent
effectively precludes the implied-consent defense. Nor is the ar-
gument to be rescued by looking to the implied consent of the
"reasonable" copyright owner.37 Regardless of whether a reasona-
ble author would consent to being the butt of a parody, or to be-
ing quoted in a scathing review, the determination as to reasona-
33. Ladd, To Cope with the World Upheaval in Copyright, 10 COPYRIGHT 289, 294 (1983)
(emphasis supplied), quoted with rather free ellipsis. Mr. Ladd, the present Register of
Copyrights, actually wrote: "In the ultimate analysis, the question is not whether a certain
activity is, for example, a "fair use," but whether, in an emerging social and economic
order, it ought to be within the control of authors so that they can maintain independent
creativity." Id.
34. See, e.g., Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d
Cir. 1938); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir.
1905); Karll v. Kurtiss Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941); Henry Holt
& Co., Inc. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
35. Yankwich, supra note 32, at 209.
36. See Cohen, supra note 32, at 50-51; Latman, supra note 22, at 7.
37. "In other words, would the reasonable copyright owner have consented to the
use?" Latman, supra note 22, at 15.
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bleness is, ultimately, no more or less than a determination of fair
use.
Two closely related notions suffer from similar weaknesses.
First, it has been suggested that "as a condition of obtaining the
statutory grant, the author is deemed to consent to certain reason-
able uses . ". . ."" Second, "[j]ustification for a reasonable use of a
copyrighted work is also said to be based on custom." 39 But it is
the doctrine of fair use that will determine what is reasonable as
well as which infringements are customarily permissible.
2. De minimis. The idea that fair use can, in at least some cir-
cumstances, be justified under the maxim de minimis non curat lex
is likely to see a revival after its mention in both the majority deci-
sion and the dissenting opinion in Betamax." Justice Blackmun's
dissent provides appropriate examples. "Photocopying an old
newspaper clipping to send to a friend may be an example; pin-
ning a quotation on one's bulletin board may be another. In each
of these cases, the effect on the author is truly de minimis.' '41
These are useful counter-examples to an absolute claim that copy-
ing an entire work or copying for the same intrinsic function can
never be a fair use, but they scarcely suggest that a lack of con-
cern for de minimis reproductions is the basis of the doctrine.
Where the justification has been mentioned in support of a fair
use holding, 42 it has been to describe the harm that the defen-
dant's use might impose upon plaintiff.4 3 In contrast, the approach
38. Latman, supra at 7. See also Note, supra note 27, at 250.
39. Latman, supra note 22, at 7.
40. The Betamax majority quoted Professor Latman: "In certain situations the copy-
right owner suffers no substantial harm from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the
partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat
lex." Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 793 n.34 (quoting Latman, supra note 22, at 30).
41. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 4107. It has sometimes been claimed that copying by hand is
always fair use, there being no reported cases to the contrary. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[E](a) (1983) (Nimmer does not agree with the claim). There is, how-
ever, a "report" of just such a case. In the middle of the sixth century, an Irish monk
named Columba, while visiting his former teacher the Abbot Finnian, made a clandestine
copy of the latter's Psalter. Finnian was furious and, when Columba would not surrender
the copy, took his complaint before King Diarmid. The king decided the case for Finnian
in words that have become an Irish proverb: "Le gach boin a boinin, le gach leabhar a leab-
hran." ("To every cow her calf, and consequently, to every book its copy.") See 3 THE
COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, THE MONKS OF THE WEST: FROM ST. BENEDICT TO ST. BERNARD
119-22 & n.2 (1867) [hereinafter cited as MONTALEMBERT].
42. E.g., Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
43. This also is the point for which the Betamax majority mentions it.
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has largely been unsuccessful in cases which involve insubstantial
usage alone.44
3. Piratical Intent. Early English cases often looked to the in-
tent of the defendant in making use of plaintiff's work. In Carey v.
Kearsley," Lord Ellenborough asked whether a particular use was
''a pretext for pirating": "Was the matter so taken used fairly
with that view, and without what I may term the animusfurandi?
. . . or taken colourable, merely with a view to steal the copy-
right of the plaintiff?" 46 Although intent has been taken into ac-
count in some American cases,47 it is usually mentioned only for
the purpose of asserting its irrelevance. 48 The reason that the ab-
sence of animus furandi, piratical intent, can not be the basis of
fair use was stated clearly and eloquently by Vice Chancellor
Wood in Scott v. Stanford: 9 "It is clear that my rights cannot be
dependent upon the mere internal and occult workings of another
man's mind. ' 50 Nevertheless, fair use is an equitable doctrine, and
the courts have properly looked with suspicion upon defendants
who could have but did not bother to pay a royalty.51
Two other theories justifying fair use have been advanced
which cannot be dismissed so readily, if they can be dismissed at
all. Indeed the problems with each seem to arise from their taking
the other too lightly. The first is the economic, "market ap-
proach," as presented in detail by Professor Wendy J. Gordon. 2
44. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304
(E.D. Pa. 1938).
45. 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1802).
46. Id. at 680.
47. See, e.g., Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323); Conde
Nast Publishing Co. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modeling, 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494 (E.D. Mich. 1888).
48. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Johns &
Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1939); Story v.
Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497); Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325
(W.D. Pa. 1884).
49. 3 L.R.-Eq. 718, 36 L.J.R. New Series (Pt. 1, Chanc.) 729 (1867).
50. 36 L.J.R. New Series at 734 (curiously, this portion of the decision was not in-
cluded in the original Equity Reports).
51. E.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982), reprinted in 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 253 (1983).
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The second is the functional approach, which focuses on the ways
in which plaintiff's work and the defendant's use of it affect soci-
ety; in variant forms this approach is presented by Professor Leon
E. Seltzer 53 and Professor Melville B. Nimmer.54
B. The Economic Model of Fair Use
There are, unquestionably, economic considerations behind
copyright law. As the Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered.5 5
This has led some to the conclusion that fair use can be deter-
mined by a simple utilitarian calculus: "The fair use doctrine is
. ..applied when the societal interest in promoting second works
or widening the dissemination of first works outweighs the
financial interest of the copyright holder." 5 Professor Gordon,5 7
however, commences her argument by swiftly discrediting this
conclusion: if the second use is of such great societal interest, it
will generate income sufficient to enable the user to pay the copy-
right owner for a license.58
Gordon argues that since the marketplace will handle most
cases within the simple calculus, fair use must apply only in mar-
For a sophisticated analysis of the "public goods" aspects of fair use economics, see
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than for Profit or
Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases,
28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 647 (1984).
53. L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 13-14.
54. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05.
55. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
56. Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 58
(1981).
57. It is not possible to present in synopsis all the detail and rich persuasiveness of
Professor Gordon's thesis. It is hoped, however, that the following does not do it too grave
an injustice.
58. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1615. While this is a dramatic and apparently convinc-
ing counter to the simple utilitarian calculus, it rests on assumptions which, though perva-
sive, are seriously in error. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text. One should also
note in passing that the description of fair use under attack here is really a description of
the circumstances in which the copyright owner is likely to be able to find a licensee.
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kets which have failed5 9-that is, markets in which the second
user cannot buy a license. 60 The market for a license in a copy-
right might fail because the work is out of print,61 because trans-
action costs (the costs involved in negotiating and obtaining a li-
cense) exceed the anticipated benefit,6 2  because of time
constraints 6 s because the benefit of the second use is not easily
quantified monetarily,64 or because the copyright owner is very
unlikely to license the second use.6 5
Market failure is but the first test in Gordon's model. If it has
occurred, the second test applies, which involves "balancing injury
and benefit": "the court should determine if the use is more valu-
able in the defendant's hands or in the hands of the copyright
owner."6 6 Professor Gordon believes that one way of making this
determination is by simulating the market inquiry: if the "market
failure" were cured and "the price that the owner would demand
[were] lower than the price that the user would offer, a transfer to
the user will increase social value. ' 6 7 Thus, this test simulates the
59. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1614-15. The market which may thus fail is defined in
terms typical of welfare economics: (1) internal costs and benefits (i.e., paid or reaped by
the parties to the transaction); (2) perfect knowledge; and (3) zero transaction costs. See id.
at 1607-08.
60. Id. at 1614-15.
61. Id. at 1627-28. Note that in Professor Gordon's model, market failure is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition for fair use; thus, that a book is out of print does not
mean that anyone can copy it freely, but it will be a factor in determining whether a second
use of it is a fair use. See 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 64.
62. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1628-29. Examples are photoreproduction or tape re-
cording. "In such situations, transaction costs are likely to prevent at least some value-
maximizing transfers from occurring . I..." d. at 1629.
63. See, e.g., 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 68-69 (spontaneous use by a
teacher).
64. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1630-32. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)
(benefits of medical research).
65. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1632-35. Examples are parody, satire, or competitive
advertising, as in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1615.
67. Id. This is a straightforward Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion: "A change is an
improvement if those who gain evaluate their gains at a higher figure than the value which
the losers set upon their losses." W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
378 (2d ed. 1965). Notice that there is no requirement that the loser be compensated from
the winner's gains or from any other source. This criterion has gained little favor among
economists. Professor Baumol writes: "[B]oth the Kaldor and the Scitovsky tests operate on
the basis of an implicit and unacceptable value judgement. By using a criterion involving
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implied-consent theory. 8 However, the more important cases are
those in which the second use has significant benefits that are ex-
ternal to the parties, so that "the price that the defendant user
would offer for use of the work will . . . understate the real social
value of his use." 9
If both the "market failure" and the "balancing of injury and
benefit" tests are met, a third and final test applies: the "substan-
tial injury hurdle": "Fair use should be denied whenever a sub-
stantial injury appears that will impair incentives. ' 70 Whereas the
second test looks to the injury and benefit in the specific case, the
final hurdle involves generalization on the specific facts. The issue
at this stage is whether a finding of fair use would substantially
impair plaintiff's or other authors' incentives.7 1 To find for defen-
dant on a fair use theory, a court must find that all three tests are
satisfied.7 2
As with most economic analyses of the law, Professor
Gordon's model has a distinct and tangible appeal: it appears sci-
entific in that it relates the specific problem addressed to wider,
more general social phenomena; it appears constructive in that it
offers a means of determining a result once a specified set of con-
ditions has been satisfied and specific values have been assigned.
Moreover, it demystifies fair use, reducing it to the level of many
other legal problems which, although still difficult, can be solved
by essentially pedestrian procedures. Yet, desirable as such analy-
sis may be, it is of no use if it does not adequately capture its sub-
ject matter. In the following paragraphs, specific criticisms will be
made of steps one and two of Professor Gordon's model, followed
by general criticisms of this whole approach to copyright law.
potential money compensation, they set up a concealed interpersonal comparison on a
money basis." Id. at 379. This is also true, ultimately, of Professor Gordon's model of fair
use, especially in those important cases in which the gain from defendant's use runs to
society and is not easily internalized as a monetary value. See supra note 64 and accompany-
ing text. On the other hand, in those cases in which the fair use defense prevails, the
plaintiff copyright owner gets no compensation at all for the use.
68. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1616-17.
69. Id. at 1615-16. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
70. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1618.
71. Id. at 1620.
72. Gordon suggests that her analysis is reflected in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1965).
See Gordon, supra note 52, at 1647-52.
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The types of "market failure" Professor Gordon describes
amount to no more than examples of a would-be user's inability to
buy a license" 3-indeed, in the case of excessively high transaction
costs,7 4 one should say inability conveniently to buy a license. But
these are scarcely cases of market failure.7 5 Suppose there is a long
line at the ice-cream counter and I am in a hurry; the transaction
costs are too high for me, but has this ice-cream market failed?
Suppose I simply do not want to sell my house, despite the offer of
a would-be buyer to pay better than a fair price;7 6 is that market
failure? The copyright owner will be understandably reluctant to
license a parodist; is that market failure? While courts have not
been kindly disposed toward plaintiffs who have taken a "dog in
the manger" attitude to offers to buy a license,7 8 the fact re-
mains that refusing to license any particular use is the copyright
owner's prerogative. Thus, Professor Gordon's list of types of
"market failure" amounts, roughly, to a list of the circumstances
in which fair use has traditionally been an appropriate, even if not
always successful, defense.
Having found failure in the market, the very foundation of
the economic theory she is using,7 9 Professor Gordon then resur-
rects it by judicial simulation in step two. It is as if litigation were
considered to be "a continuation of negotiation by other means."
But a copyright owner who cannot be induced to take a fee from
the user surely will not permit the same use free. Yet this is pre-
cisely the result envisioned by Professor Gordon's judicial
simulation.
73. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. Gordon recognizes that copyrighted
works are, in an economic sense, public goods, but she fails to recognize the consequences
of this. Cirace, however, provides a thorough, but complicated, analysis of these conse-
quences. Compare Gordon, supra note 52, at 1610-12, with Cirace, supra note 52.
74. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
75. A standard assumption of some economists is that a person will always sell if the
price is right. Such an assumption, however, would merely deny the existence of market
failure in many of Professor Gordon's examples.
76. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(Life magazine refused offer by prospective publisher to pay for pictures, the publication
rights of which were held by Life).
77. A dog does not eat hay and thus has no use for the manger; yet, its presence in the
manger prevents other animals that do eat hay from enjoying the manger's benefits.
78. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Lombard, J., concurring). See also Time, 293 F. Supp. at 130.
79. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1601.
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The cases to which Professor Gordon's notion of market fail-
ure seems most apt are those in which the critical benefits are ex-
ternal to the hypothetical transaction between plaintiff and defen-
dant. 0 These are cases in which defendant's use is of great
interest and benefit to society, but interest and benefit of a kind
that will not be reaped, monetarily, by defendant; thus, the use
will not generate income to pass along to the plaintiff copyright
owner.81 Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates 2 is illustrative. Time
had purchased the rights to the Zapruder film of the assassination
of President Kennedy. Defendant copied two key frames in a "se-
rious, thoughtful and impressive"8 3 book analyzing the assassina-
tion. The district court held that the public importance of the
book and its subject matter supported a finding of fair use.84 Even
in these cases, apparently, the court should estimate the economic
value of this societal benefit so that it can be balanced against
plaintiff's injury.85
Taking into account the externality of societal interest and
benefit is a crucial aspect of fair use analysis-indeed, it is the cor-
nerstone of American copyright law. But the problem here is one
of reducing this externality into terms which can be used in calcu-
lating harm to the plaintiff copyright owner. Such reductions are
endemic in economic analyses of the law. 8 Explaining a judicial
80. Such benefits or costs are called "externalities." "What converts a harmful or ben-
eficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the deci-
sions of one or more of the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile. .. "
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 347,
348 (1967).
81. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1615-16, 1630.
82. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83. Id. at 131-32.
84. The majority's argument in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1965), is similar; the
public benefit from medical research so impressed the court as to overwhelm other
considerations.
85. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1616. Professor Gordon actually says courts in fact make
intuitive estimates of social value, not that they should.
86. Consider the following extreme example:
[R]estraining young children from swinging on the refrigerator door repre-
sents an investment in the form of "repair" that may well be less costly than
hiring a serviceman at a later date to install new hinges. . .. [lit is an allocative
investment by a consumer that extends the useful life of the product by reduc-
ing the possibility of a future loss.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1309-10 (1981). There
is no hint in the text that this is intended tongue-in-cheek.
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decision by showing how the various policies, values, and actions
were given economic values and balanced against each other dem-
onstrates nothing; the assignments of economic value attributed to
the judge will be those which support his or her decision. Unless
there is some independent source of the economic value assign-
ment, such as a genuine ongoing market,87 the economic analysis
is not an explanation but merely a disguised description.
Gordon clearly recognizes this difficulty.
When defendant's use contributes something of importance to public knowl-
edge, political debate, or human health, it may be difficult to state the social
worth of that contribution as a dollar figure ....
... What one deals with here may be not only traditional market fail-
ure, .*. . but also a court's perception that the criterion of economic "value"
is itself flawed.88
What Gordon does not seem to recognize is that because of such
post-hoc valuation, her second test fails in precisely those cases in
which her first test works. The defendant second user is not a suit-
able medium through which to reify the promotion of progress of
science.
Nor is the other side of this economic balancing-the injury
to the plaintiff copyright owner-immune to attack. The Honora-
ble David Ladd, United States Register of Copyrights, has spoken
forcefully against this "unhistoric interloper" in the law of copy-
right.8 ' To throw upon the plaintit ° the burden of proving that
his injury outweighs the benefits of the defendant's use would be
quite contrary to the spirit, tradition, and statutory law of copy-
right." The point of providing statutory "in lieu" damages92 as an
87. Of course there is no market in children swinging on refrigerator doors. However,
there might be an empirical study showing deterioration rates of such doors from which
the economic value of each swing could be deduced. This kind of data, however, is not
available to one seeking to assess the general benefit to society in question in Betamax.
88. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1631-32 (footnotes omitted).
89. See Ladd, Economic Harm: A Trojan Horse in Copyright, in A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAw, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, 1982, at 157 (luncheon address)
[hereinafter cited as Ladd, Trojan Horse in Copyright]; Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm
in Copyright: The Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 421
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Ladd, Harm in Copyright].
90. The allocation of the burden of proof in a fair use defense raises difficult ques-
tions. But in the context of steps two and three of Professor Gordon's model, who else but
plaintiff is there?
91. See generally, Ladd, supra note 89.
92. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982).
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alternative to actual damages is that plaintiff's damages are often
impossible to quantify. Mr. Ladd puts it very strongly: "To posit,
in any sense, a finding of 'fair use' on the absence of demonstrable
present damages is to do nothing less than deprive copyright of
any future life."'9 3 Yet demonstrating quantified damages is ex-
actly what is required in step two of Professor Gordon's model. 4
Even if the plaintiff is able to quantify his or her damages, it
is not clear that the proper balance can be struck. The economic
philosophy of the Supreme Court focuses not on the harm to the
copyright owner but on the harm to the incentive to authors. It is
assumed that plaintiff's damages provide a reasonable measure of
the detriment to incentives; the assumption, however, is not be-
yond significant empirical doubt.95 If there has to be value balance
here it should be between the societal benefit in promotion of the
progress of science and the detrimental impact on incentives to
authorship. Neither of these is readily amenable to translation
into monetary values.
There is a more pervasive problem with economic analyses of
copyright law-indeed, of any area of law. Professor Walzer90 has
provided the insight necessary to bringing this problem to the
fore. According to Professor Walzer, goods (of all kinds, including
services, labor, ideas) have social meanings and social importance
that can often be quite independent of their market (dollar) val-
ues. 97 What counts as efficiency, what the proper maximand in a
value calculus is, and even what the nature of that calculus itself
will be, are questions which are decided in terms of these social
meanings and values. In any given structural sphere of society
there is likely to be one social value, the "dominant value" of that
sphere, which determines or should determine the distribution of
the goods within it.99 Distributive justice is not uniform but varies
93. Ladd, A Trojan Horse in Copyright, supra note 89, at 159.
94. If potential future damage is also to be estimated, quantitatively, the balancing
again becomes so speculative as to bear little, if any, relation to reality.
95. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 293-313 (1970).
96. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
97. Id. at 6-10.
98. in some spheres, (e.g, futures trading) the dominant value will, of course, be
straightforwardly economic. The dominant value in the sphere of copyright is given in the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The sole interest of the United States and
the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932),
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according to its subject matter-its sphere of justice. There is no
reason to believe that the dominant value of one sphere should be
the same as that of another; one would not expect the same crite-
rion of justice to apply in the distribution of automobiles, welfare
payments, and spouses. Nor is there any reason to believe that
there is any common denominator of dominant values. Things
tend to go awry when the dominant value of one sphere is sup-
planted by that of another.
In the sphere of literature and the arts-that is, the sphere of
copyright-the dominant value is given in the Constitution: "To
promote the progress of science . . . ." As Mr. Ladd puts it:
"Copyright should boost the GNP of mind and feeling."100
Already we can see in literature and the arts the effects of the
invasion of the profit motive to the exclusion of all else.101 Any-
one who watches television cannot but be saddened by the impact
of this displacement; there seems to be an entertainment analogue
of Gresham's Law: bad television drives out good television.
10 2
So may it be on the commercial side of the creative arts, and
there is little that copyright law can or should do about it. Justice
Holmes properly warned against making artistic merit a condition
of copyright protection.10 3 It would nevertheless be wrong for
copyright law likewise to accept the usurpation of its proper domi-
nant value by profit.?°
99. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Science," as used in the late eighteenth century, was
intended in the sense of the Latin "scire," meaning all knowledge.
100. Ladd, Harm in Copyright, supra note 89, at 429.
101. Anthony Burgess writes of "Irving Wallace, Arthur Hailey, Frederick Forsyth,
Ken Follett and other practitioners of well wrought sensational fiction": "They do not pre-
tend to be Henry James; they expect, unlike James, to make money out of a popular com-
modity." N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, § 7, at 1, 36 (book review section). This is not to
disparage popular fiction; but today, when major publishing houses are controlled by
merchant bankers and oil company executives rather than lovers of literature, one wonders
how a Henry James would find a publisher.
102. Sir Thomas Gresham, a sixteenth-century British financier, is noted for the eco-
uiomic principle that "bad money drives out good money." See F. SALTER, SIR THOMAS
GRESHAM 37 (1925). Gresham actually expounded this principle in somewhat more Elizabe-
than terms: In a letter to Her Majesty, he reported:
[T]he first occasion of the fall of the Exchange did grow by the King's Majesty,
your late Father, in abasing his coin from vi ounces fine to iii ounces fine.
Whereupon the Exchange fell from xxxvis viiid to xiiis ivd, which was the occa-
sion that all your fine gold was conveyed out of this your realm.
Id.
103. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1908).
104. This is not to say that copyright owners ought not seek to maximize their profits;
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C. The "Intrinsic-Extrinsic" or "Functional" Approach to Fair Use
Seltzer c5 and Nimmer 06 differ from Gordon in that they
would not permit copying for a purpose which is not itself inde-
pendently productive. Professor Gordon, who would allow such
usage despite its being for the same intrinsic function, acknowl-
edges that on her analysis "the 'productive' status of a user is at
"9107best merely a secondary indicator ....
Seltzer states the historical case most forcefully; of the Regis-
ter's illustrative list of areas of application of the fair use doc-
trine,10 8 he writes:
The list, casual or studied as it may be, reflects what in fact the subject mat-
ter of fair use has in the history of its adjudication consisted in: It has always
had to do with the use by a second author of a first author's work. Fair use has not
heretofore had to do with the mere reproduction of a work in order to use it
for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be called the "ordinary" use
of it. When copies are made for the work's "ordinary" purposes, ordinary
infringement has customarily been-triggered, not notions of fair use. 10 9
Professor Nimmer, albeit in different language, makes essentially
the same point, but with less historical and more normative em-
phasis: "if . . . the defendant's work, although containing sub-
stantially similar material, performs a different function than that
of the plaintiff's, the defense of fair use may be invoked."" 0 The
distinction is clearly illustrated by Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co."'
In that case, the Saturday Evening Post had published the copy-
righted lyrics to the chorus of the Green Bay Packers' "official
song" in an article on the town of Green Bay. The court sustained
the fair use defense largely because "the later work differs greatly
the economic philosophy still lies behind the constitutionally mandated means of further-
ing copyright's goal. See supra text accompanying note 55. It is, however, curious that we
tend to socialize the production of many of the works that we expect to be the most instru-
mental in promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.
105. See generally L. SELTZER, supra note 10.
106. See 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05.
107. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1601.
108. See supra text accompanying note 28.
109. L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 24 (emphasis supplied).
110. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05[B]. It is this same distinction that is re-
ferred to by Professor Gordon as "productive." It has also been characterized, usefully, by
the dichotomy between "iterative" (same-purpose) and "interactive" (new-purpose) copy-
ing. See Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological
Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1982).
111. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
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in nature, scope, and purpose from the original." ' x12
A second feature of Professor Gordon's analysis with which
Professor Nimmer would presumably differ is that it would permit
the fair use defense even where the defendant had copied plain-
tiff's work in its entirety." 3 Even in criticism, which is the para-
digm fair use purpose, there is a limit to how much of plaintiff's
work may be reproduced. "[C]opying substantially all of the plain-
tiff's work for the asserted purpose of literary (or religious) criti-
cism, will not constitute fair use.""' 4 Just such a consideration was
critical in Benny v. Loew's Inc."' The comedian Jack Benny had
made a television parody ("Autolight") of plaintiff's prize winning
motion picture "Gas Light." The fair use defense was denied
since the parody was held simply to have used too much of the
original: "If the material taken by appellant from 'Gas Light' is
eliminated, there are left only a few gags, and some disconnected
and incoherent dialogue.""' 6 The court also quoted a well known
passage from an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion: "Counsel have not
disclosed a single authority, nor have we been able to find one,
which lends any support to the proposition that wholesale copying
and publication of copyrighted material can ever be fair use.""'
The most striking counter-example is Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States."" Two government libraries had photocopied arti-
112. Id. at 837-38. Professor Nimmer contrasts this case with Johns &Johns Printing
Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1939), in which the defendant
had printed the chorus lyrics of plaintiff's song but in a song-sheet pamphlet; appropriately,
no fair use was found. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05[B].
113. That Professor Gordon's analysis encompasses 100% copying is demonstrated by
her use of Williams & Wilkins as an illustration. See Gordon, supra note 52, at 1647-52.
114. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05[B].
115. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affid by an equally divided Court sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting Serv. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
116. Benny, 239 F.2d at 536. One does not have to agree wholeheartedly with the
decision to understand the point.
117. Id., (quoting Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937) (em-
phasis added in Benny)). Among other things the plaintiff in Leon was the publisher of a
telephone directory; the defendant published a telephone directory derived from it but
using the numerical order of the telephone numbers.
Other noteworthy cases in which the fair use has failed because of too great an appro-
priation of plaintiffls work include Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Justice Story's opinion contains a
wealth of basic fair use lore) and Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1914) (the "Mutt and Jeff" case) (appropriation led to decrease in demand for plaintiff's
original work).
118. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
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cles from plaintiff's copyrighted medical journal at the request of
medical researchers;11 9 these copies were for the same intrinsic
purpose as the originals and usually copied substantially all of the
original work. The case was extremely close: The trial judge
found in favor of plaintiff;120 the Court of Claims reversed, split-
ting 4-3; and the Supreme Court affirmed, splitting 4-4. As men-
tioned earlier, the majority in the Court of Claims was over-
whelmed by the social importance of the second users' work:
medical research. It expressly rejected the argument that "the
copying of an entire work, any such work, cannot ever be 'fair
use' " as "an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the deci-
sions . "121 Not surprisingly, the decision has met with little
approval from the commentators. 22 Professor Nimmer asserted
that it was "seriously in error.' 23 Nevertheless the case should
serve to remind us that the "rules" against second uses for the
same intrinsic function and one-hundred percent copying are not
absolute. At the very least there are the de minimis counter-exam-
ples;124 there may be more.
D. The Constitutional Justification of Fair Use
The essence of these different approaches can be captured in
a useful and historically accurate synthesis based on copyright
(1975).
119. This was done on a quite remarkable scale, one library having made "86,000
Xerox copies in 1970 constituting 930,000 pages," the other, in 1968, "distributed
120,000 copies of such journal articles, totalling about 1.2 million pages." 487 F.2d at
1364 (Cowan, J., dissenting).
120. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (1977).
121. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353. In support, the majority referred to hand-
written copies for personal use, copies of cases, annotations and law review articles for
courts, and to the copying of newspaper items. Id. See supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
122. See, e.g., L. SELTzER, supra note 10, 39-41; Goldstein, The Private Consumption of
Public Goods: A Comment on Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 21 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
204 (1974); Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland,
22 UCLA L. REv. 1052 (1975) (the reference in the title is to Judge Nichols' remark in his
Williams & Wilkins dissent that "[w]e are making the Dred Scott decision of copyright law."
Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1387).
123. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at § 13.05[E](c). Congress also has effectively dis.
avowed the decision by removing library copying from the ambit of fair use, including it in
a clearly and closely rule-governed exemption provision: section 108 of the 1976 Copyright
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
288 [Vol. 33
FAIR USE AFTER BETAMAX
law's first principle:125 "The fundamental justification for the [fair
use] privilege lies in the constitutional purpose in granting copy-
right protection in the first instance, to wit, 'To Promote the Pro-
gress of Science and the Useful Arts'." '126 In favor of a claimed
fair use a court will have to consider the extent to which the sec-
ond use in question does serve this constitutionally mandated pur-
pose. Such consideration must be given, however, only to the ex-
tent that defendant's second use promotes this goal independently
of the plaintiff's first use: if the second use serves to "boost the
GNP of mind and feeling"'127 in the same manner as does the first,
nothing will be gained by permitting the incursion into plaintiff's
copyright. Thus, the general prohibition against second uses for
the same intrinsic purpose as the first use follows from the funda-
mental purpose of copyright law.
On the other side is the means Congress must use in promot-
ing this goal: "by securing for limited times to authors .. .the
exclusive right to their . ..writings."' 2  As noted above,12 9 the
federal copyright statutes prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, in ac-
cord with the mandated exclusivity, state the copyright owner's
rights absolutely. There is, then, a tension between the goal of
copyright protection and the means of achieving it.' 30
The connection between the constitutional purpose and the
means of copyright law lies in the "economic philosophy" articu-
lated in Mazer v. Stein:'3 1 granting authors monopolies (albeit of
limited duration) provides them with the income and the incentive
to enable them to produce. The value of this monopoly is realized
by the copyright owner through the distribution of his or her
work to the public at a price. It follows that a second use which
125. This analysis is not new. It can be found explicitly in Farmer v. Calvert Litho-
graphing, 8 F. Cas. 1022, 1026 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872) (No. 4561): "The courts, in the
interest of learning and science, have at all times and in all countries recognized the right
of subsequent authors, compilers, and publishers to use the works of others to a certain
extent ...." See also Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680
(K.B. 1802).
126. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307.
127. See supra text accompanying note 100.
128. U.S. CoNsT. art. I , § 8, cl. 8.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
130. See Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Maintaining Copyright Equilibrium, 43
LA. L. REv. 735 (1983).
131. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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amounts to no more than an additional or different mode of dis-
tribution should not be fair use; this would be a use precisely con-
trary to the constitutionally mandated method of furthering copy-
right's goal. 132 Copying by the defendant of all or substantially all
of the plaintiffs work will usually effect an alternative means of
dissemination; accordingly it is not surprising that we find a gen-
eral rejection of the fair use defense in such cases.
Thus the general rules against second uses for the same in-
trinsic purpose and one-hundred percent copying both follow
from the constitutional foundation of copyright. There is good
historical reason to believe that this was the original intent. Prior
to the enactment of the first federal copyright statute in 1790,
four states' 33 had provisions in their copyright statutes for issuing
132. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 59 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136): "[I]t is
difficult to acquiesce in the reason sometimes given, that the compiler of an abridgment is a
benefactor to mankind, by assisting in the diffusion of knowledge." See also Wainright
Secs., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977); Bell v. Whitehead, 3
Jurist. 68, 8 L.J. (Ch.) 141 (Chanc. 1839). But see Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353. For
treatment of this argument by the majority in Betamax, see infra text accompanying note
247.
133. Connecticut, Georgia, New York, and South Carolina. See B. BUCBEE, supra note
16, at 104-24. The relevant part of the Connecticut statute read:
Be it further enacted, That when ever any such Author or Proprietor of Such
Book, Pamphlet, Map or Chart, shall neglect to furnish the Public with suffi-
cient Editions thereof, or shall sell the same at a Price unreasonable, and be-
yond what may be adjudged a sufficient Compensation for his Labour, Time,
Expense, and Risque of Sale, the Judge of the Superior Court in this State, on
Complaint thereof made to him in Writing, is hereby authorized and im-
powered to summon such Author or Proprietor to appear before the next Su-
perior court . . . and said Court are hereby authorized and impowered to en-
quire into the Justice of said Complaint, and if the same be found true, to take
such sufficient recognizance and Security of such Author or Proprietor, condi-
tioned that he shall within such reasonable Time, as said court shall direct, pub-
lish and offer for Sale in this State, a sufficient Number of Copies of such Book,
Pamphlet, Map or Chart, at such reasonable Price as said Court shall, on due
Consideration affix: And if such Author or Proprietor shall, before said Court,
neglect or refuse to give such Security as aforesaid, the court are hereby au-
thorized and impowered to give such Complainant, a full and ample Licence to
re-print and publish such Book, Pamphlet, Map or Chart, in such Numbers and
for such Term as said Court shall judge just and reasonable: Provided said
Complainant shall give sufficient Security before said Court, to afford said re-
print Edition at such reasonable Price as said court shall thereto affix.
Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts and Laws,
printed in ACTS AND LAws OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 133, 134 (E. Babcock
ed. 1786). For a discussion of this part of the seminal Connecticut Act, see B. BUGBEE, supra
note 16, at 108-09.
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a compulsory license to another should the copyright owner fail to
make the work available or fail to make it available at a reasonable
price."" The members of the first Congress were unquestionably
aware of these provisions and yet chose not to incorporate them
in the first copyright statute.1 35 Since then, -when Congress has in-
tended to provide for one-hundred percent uses for similar pur-
poses, such as in compulsory licensing for recording music, it has
done so expressly.138 The absence of general provisions of this
kind in the first copyright statute and subsequent revisions can
only be intended.1 3 7
Having found the defendant's second use to be neither a sub-
stantial duplication of plaintiff's first work nor a use for the same
intrinsic purpose as the first, a court must then decide the key
judgmental issue: is the second use of such value to the promotion
of knowledge and understanding as to outweigh its detrimental
impact upon author's incentives? Ascertaining the detriment to in-
centives is one of the most neglected difficulties of fair use analy-
sis. As Breyer 38 has shown, loss of incentive does not follow auto-
matically from even quite substantial imperfections in the
copyright owner's monopoly. That the relatively minor imperfec-
tion caused by the claimed fair use has any impact whatsoever on
incentives would seem doubtful. Nevertheless, in the absence of a
better test, the actual or potential harm to plaintiff is the standard
for detrimental impact on authors' incentives.
On the assumption that harm to plaintiff is the proper mea-
sure of disincentive, the task becomes one of balancing the socie-
tal value of the second use with its encroachment on plaintiff's
"exclusive" rights.' 39 "[C]ourts in passing upon particular claims
134. North Carolina had a provision for enforcing a fair price. See B. BUGBEE, supra
note 16, at 120.
135. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1982)).
136. Compare, section 115 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982), with
section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075,
1075-76.
137. See generally Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congres-
sional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
138. See Breyer, supra note 95, at 293-313.
139. This is very similar to Marsh's statement of fair use quoted above; see supra text
accompanying note 56. The fallacies in Professor Gordon's counter to it should now be
clear: first, the values promoted by the second use cannot and ought not be reduced to
economic units; second, the harm to plaintiff is not necessarily a true measure of harm to
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of infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright
holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater
public interest in the development of art, science and industry. "140
There may be balancing here, but it is not delicate; the balance
must be tipped solidly in defendant's favor for the fair use defense
to prevail. Usually this requires there be at most a very minor im-
pact on plaintiff's rights, together with a clearly valuable second
use.
The fair use doctrine might best be described not in terms of
affirmatively serving copyright's purpose, but rather as a guard
against the negative effects of too punctilious an enforcement of
plaintiff's rights. Lord Mansfield expressed the dangers thus:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the
one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the
community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of
their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded. 14
Fair use guards primarily against the latter danger, but always
subject to the constraints imposed by the former.' 42
This balancing is not an economic one; even calling it a "bal-
ancing" is misleading because there is no reason to expect that the
benefits and harms of a given second use can be expressed in com-
mensurate terms. Similarly, one cannot expect precisely the same
constitutive elements to be present or to have the same propor-
tionate influence in different cases.'43 Indeed, even within a given
type of use the scope of fair use might change as conditions in
society change; were today's world not one of "unrelieved solem-
incentives.
140. Berlin v. E.G. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964); see also Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307.
141. Sayre v. Moore (K.B. 1785) (Mansfield, C.J.), reprinted in Gory v. Longmen, 1
East. 358, 361 n.(b), 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b) (K.B. 1801). It is not surprising that this
is stated in terms of the copyright owner's monopoly rather than terms regarding incen-
tives to authors: Lord Mansfield was a firm believer in a natural law copyright of perpetual
duration inhering in an author by virtue of his creation of the work (following in the classic
liberal tradition of John Locke). See J. LocKE, SECOND TREarSE OF GOVERNMENT 27 (1690).
See also Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). That Mansfield's
view has always been rejected in the United States highlights the technical inaccuracy of
this passage; the true risk is that authors' incentives will be impaired.
142. See L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 28-37 ("dual-risk" approach to fair use).
143. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Gas. 342, 348 (G.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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nity," 1 " the fair use privilege to parody might not be so broad.
Consider the facts of Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers To-
bacco Co.145 The defendant had used three sentences of plaintiff's
treatise on the nature and care of the human voice in an advertis-
ing pamphlet (the excerpts constituting about one-twentieth of
the pamphlet). The second use was of only a small fraction of
plaintiff's work and for a quite different function; it could scarcely
have had serious impact on plaintiff's sales of the work or the au-
thor's incentive to produce further such works. Yet, on the other
hand, the second use in question did so little to "promote the pro-
gress of science" or to "increase the GNP of mind and feeling"
that the court quite properly felt justified in denying the fair use
privilege to defendants. Note, however, the significant danger of
this approach: literary and artistic judgment and even motives of
censorship 146 could cause a court illegitimately to devalue the so-
cial importance of a second work.1 47
This explication of the fair use doctrine appears to capture
the major threads of judicial thought in the decisions prior to the
1976 Copyright Act. It provides no talismanic solutions; it pro-
duces results which vary according to a great many factors which
must be assessed differently with different types of use. It also in-
evitably requires difficult judgments, thereby increasing the risks
of misuse. This is hardly surprising in an area that is "the most
144. Elsemere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.
1980), affg 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
145. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
146. Censorship is no stranger to copyright law. In the first English translation case,
Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (1720), an injunction was granted against publica-
tion of defendant's translation of a work in Latin because it "contain[ed] strange notions
intended by the author to be concealed from the vulgar in the Latin language, in which
language could not do much hurt, the learned being better able to judge of it." Id. at 1009.
147. The danger of censorship interfering in this way seems to have been realized.
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) involved a parody ("Cunnilingus Cham-
pion of Company C") of plaintiff's copyrighted song ("Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Com-
pany B"). Judge Von Graafeiland wrote for the majority, inter alia: "We are not prepared
to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's copyrighted song, substi-
tute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for a commercial gain, and then escape liability by
calling the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society." Id. at 185. In dissent,
Judge Mansfield responded: "We cannot, under the guise of deciding a copyright issue, act
as a board of censors outlawing X-rated performances. Obscenity or pornography play no
part in this case." Id. at 191. The case was decided under the 1976 Copyright Act; under
prior fair use law it might have been decided differently.
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troublesome in the whole law of copyright. 14 8
II. FAIR USE IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Legislative History of Section 107
In 1961, the Honorable Abraham Kaminstein, then Register
of Copyright, recommended in his report to Congress149 that the
revised copyright statute upon which work was then commencing
"should include a provision affirming and indicating the scope of
the principle that fair use does not infringe the copyright owner's
rights."' 50 There was very little opposition to such inclusion at
that time, nor has there been since.1 51 Indeed it was generally
agreed that, as the Register's Report argued, it would be "anoma-
lous to have the statute specify the rights of copyright owners in
absolute terms without indicating that those rights are subject to
the limitation of fair use. 1 52 The new copyright statute was to be
the first in the United States expressly recognizing the judicially
created doctrine of fair use.
At no time during the consideration of the statute was there
any serious argument that in the fair use provision any attempt
should be made to change or reform the judicial doctrine. The
Register's statement that "[t]he intention of section 107 is to give
statutory affirmation to the present judicial doctrine, not to
change it"1 53 was accepted without disagreement. There was,
however, considerable disagreement as to how the doctrine should
148. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
149. See 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 28. This draft was preceded by Professor
Latman's comprehensive report, see Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, supra note 22,
which was the fourteenth of a series of studies of various aspects of copyright law. Id. See
also A. LATMAN & J. LIGHTSTONE, THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT (1981).
150. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 25.
151. Philip Wattenberg, for the Music Publishers Association, argued to the contrary:
"If this provision is included it will mean tests of innumerable uses, some of which will be
uneconomical to test, so that you will find rights being waived by inactivity." COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION-PART 2, 88TH CONG., 1ST SEss., DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 399-
401 (Comm. Print 1963). Note that despite its stated point the argument opposes defining
fair use in the statute rather than merely recognizing it.
152. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 25.
153. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-PART 6, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPPLEMENTARY RE.
PORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAWS: 1965 REVISION BILL 28 (Comm. Print 1965).
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be enacted in the statute. Should the statute merely state the exis-
tence of fair use or should it include a definition? How could fair
use be defined?
The first of these questions was initially and finailly resolved in
favor of including guidelines, if not a genuine definition.""' In his
1961 Report, the Register included a list of "examples of the
kinds of uses that may be permitted under [the] concept,"'155 and
wrote:
Whether any particular use of a copyrighted work constitutes a fair use
rather than an infringement of copyright has been said to depend upon (1)
the purpose of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the
amount and substantiality of the material used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use on the copyright owner's po-
tential market for his work.158
This preliminary suggestion was adopted as the basis of the first
answer to the question of content. 57 In 1964 it was modified to
include a list of examples of the kinds of uses contemplated. 5 '
154. It has long been acknowledged that formulating a determinate definition of fair
use is impossible. See, e.g., 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 65. This rests on an expec-
tation of more in such a definition than the nature of the subject matter permits. See supra
text accompanying notes 24-32. But this difference, however, is merely verbal.
155. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 24. See supra text accompanying note
28.
156. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 24.
157. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-PART 3-PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW § 6 (1964):
§6. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: FAIR USE. All of the exclusive rights
specified in section 5 shall be limited by the privilege of making fair use of
copyrighted work. In determining whether, under the circumstances in any par-
ticular case, the use of a copyrighted work constitutes a fair use rather than an
infringement of copyright, the following factors, among others, shall be consid-
ered: (a) the purpose and character of the use, (b) the nature of the copyrighted
work, (c) the amount and substantiality of the material used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole, and (d) the effect of the use upon the potential
value of the copyrighted work.
158. Three identical versions of the 1964 revision bill were introduced: S. 3008, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1964); H.R. 11,947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. 12,354, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). All of these included the following provision:
§ 6. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: FAIR USE.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 5, the fair use of a copyrighted
work to the extent reasonably necessary or incidental to a legitimate purpose
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research is
not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall
include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
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There followed an interesting debate between those who
would keep this definition or a modified version of it in the statute
and those who would have no definition. Opposed to the defini-
tion were publishers (both of books and of music), newspapers, the
presses, authors, composers, the Patent Law Association, the
American Bar Association, publishers of educational materials,
and a record manufacturer.' 9 They argued that a definition could
not be fair and equitable, would destroy the flexibility inherent in
the judicial doctrine, and might well change (i.e., broaden) the ef-
fective scope of the fair use privilege.10 In 1965 their arguments
prevailed and the third draft of the fair use provision read: "Sec.
107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use[.] Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright."""1
The debate, however, continued. In favor of an elaboration
of the fair use provision were scholars, educational television, edu-
cators, the General Services Administration, and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 2 It would appear that some
on this side of the argument sought a definition for the purpose of
including a special provision for their interests rather than for any
intrinsic value it might have.6 3 Others, however, argued for defi-
nitional guidelines on the basis of the need for certainty.1 64 "[A]
number of witnesses representing various educational and schol-
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
159. See generally COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION -PART 5, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1964 REVI-
SION BILL wrru DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 33-345 (1965).
160. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcommit-
tee No. 3 of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1673, 1674 (1965) (statement of
Harry F. Howard, for Book Mfrs. Inst.); id. at 66, 70, 75-76 (statement of Lee Deighton,
for American Textbook Publishers Inst.); id., 1215, 1216 (statement of Mark Carroll for
Association of Am. Univ. Presses).
161. S. 1006, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 (identical bills), 89th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1965).
162. Hearings, supra note 160, at 1554-55 (statement of Frederick Burkhardt for
American Council of Learned Soc'ys); id. at 1906 (statement of Gordon M. Freeman, Presi-
dent, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers).
163. See, e.g., id. at 488-89 (testimony of Eugene L. Aleinikoff, Chairman, for Joint
Nat'l Educ. Television-Educ. Television Stations Music and Copyright Comm.); id. at
1112-14 (statement of Lawson B. Knott, Jr., General Servs. Admin.).
164. See supra note 162.
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arly organizations criticized the [1965] provision as vague and
nebulous, and stressed the need of teachers and scholars to be cer-
tain whether what they were doing constituted fair use or in-
fringement. '"165 This argument prevailed. In 1966 the fair use
provision was restored to the detailed form of 1964, differing
from the present statute only in its lack of the two express refer-
ences to educational uses.16 1
The draft statute remained unchanged from 1966 through to
1976 when educators1 67 succeeded in having the parenthetical
"(including multiple copies for classroom use)" included in the
first sentence of section 107 and the tag "including whether such
purpose is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes" added to subsection one. In this form the fair use pro-
vision of the 1976 Copyright Act became law.16 s With this vehicle
Congress sought "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair
use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." ' 9 Did it
succeed?
165. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1967).
166. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966):
§ 107 LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: FAIR USE.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The 1967 version, H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., lse Sess. (1967), changed only the dash before
subsection 107(1), replacing it with a colon. The dash eventually found its way back. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
167. See Hearings, Before Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 276-78 (1975) (testimony of Bernard J. Freitag for Nat'l Educ.
Ass'n); id. at 291-92 (statement of Robert F. Hogan, Nat'l Council of Teachers of English).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
169. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 66; 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at
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B. The Form of Section 107
Professor Latman has very clearly and concisely analyzed the
form of section 107.
[T]his provision has three parts to it: (1) a conclusory statement that "fair
use . . . is not an infringement of copyright"; (2) an illustrative list of the
purposes of uses which may be included within the exemption; and (3) an
illustrative list of the factors or criteria to be used in making the pertinent
determination.1
7 0
The first sentence of section 107 also contains the language "in-
cluding such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by [section 106]. . . ." This language is
essentially interstitial, serving only to emphasize that the kinds of
use contemplated are not limited by the (then) present technol-
ogy. 17 ' For present purposes the crucial elements are the list of
illustrative purposes in the first sentence of section 107 and the
numbered list of criteria which comprise the second sentence.
Discussions of the fair use defense tend to move directly to
the numbered criteria with little more than a cursory mention of
the first sentence of section 107.172 This omission is in error. Con-
gress included the list of exemplary purposes in section 107 with
serious intent, and no court or commentator should overlook it. A
justification for the neglect of the first sentence is suggested by
one commentator. 7 The 1976 House Report includes: "These
criteria are relevant in determining whether the basic doctrine of
fair use, as stated in the first sentence of section 107, applies in a
particular case . . .",14 One is tempted accordingly to treat the
170. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HowEL's COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE
1976 Acr 204 (5th ed. 1979).
171.
[T]he reference to fair use "by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means" is mainly intended to make clear that the doctrine has as
much application to photocopying and taping as to older forms of use; it is not
intended to give these kinds of reproduction any special status under the fair
use provision or to sanction any reproduction beyond the normal and reasona-
ble limits of fair use.
1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 66.
172. E.g., Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating Public Access and Economic Incentive in
Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REv. 243, 254 (1979); Note, Copyright: Gone with the Betamax? 8
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 45, 52 (1978-1979).
173. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use" Looks Different on Video-
tape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1013 (1980).
174. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 65.
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first sentence as nothing more than "a conclusory statement that
'fair use . . . is not an infringement of copyright' "1175 with the
second sentence's enumerated factors being the determinants of
its application. Such treatment would be too hasty. 6
Suppose a defendant literary critic in an infringement action
raises the defense of fair use. His use of the plaintiff's copyrighted
work in a critical essay is clearly within the purposes contemplated
in the first sentence of section 107, and the issue remaining is
whether it fulfills one of the criteria enumerated in the second
sentence. However, should the defendant make photocopies of
the plaintiff's work to distribute as Christmas gifts, his or her use
of the copyrighted work clearly would not be within the purposes
contemplated in the first sentence of section 107. If the analysis of
this latter hypothetical proceeded to a consideration of the crite-
ria enumerated in the second sentence, then the list of purposes in
the first sentence would be mere surplusage.
Congress intended section 107 to restate the judicial doctrine
of fair use.17 If this intent is to be effectuated, the list of appro-
priate fair use purposes in section 107's first sentence cannot be
ignored. If Congress had been entirely successful, then reconsid-
eration under section 107 of prior cases involving the defense of
fair use should "affirm" the original holdings. But if such an anal-
ysis rests solely on the second sentence's enumerated criteria, this
will not necessarily follow.
Consider Henry Holt & Co.,1 8 the case in which defendant un-
successfully argued that the use in an advertising pamphlet of
three sentences from plaintiffs treatise on the human voice was
fair use. Analyzed just on the basis of the four criteria enumer-
ated in the second sentence of section 107, the case should have
resulted in a finding of fair use: the fact that the second use was
for a commercial purpose 119 is not dispositive,1 80 and the nature of
175. See supra text accompanying note 170.
176. It should also be obvious that a statement of the basic doctrine of fair use is not
the same as a statement that the doctrine is recognized.
177. The Supreme Court has explained, however: "We have already decided that the
'customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reorganized
without changing substance' cannot be taken at face value." Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 8 n.5 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966)).
178. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938); see supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982).
180. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171
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the copyrighted work seems to be of little consequence;181 "the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole"'1 82 was minuscule; and "the effect of
the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work, 1 83 although alleged by plaintiff to be relevant, was in fact
insignificant. Only by resort to the first sentence's list of purposes
can this case be reconciled with section 107.
Since the enactment of section 107, most cases decided under
it have been either relatively clear or have, properly, used the
whole section. There have, however, been decisions based exclu-
sively on section 107's four factors; these cases would have been
decided the same way under prior law, but would have followed a
different and more certain path to that result. Such decisions are
troublesome in view of the need for certainty, which was an im-
portant consideration in Congress's opting for the inclusion of
guidelines in the fair use section.184 Subsections one through four
each present a question of fact. While the first three are ordinarily
quite readily resolved, the fourth, which is usually considered the
most important,1 85 presents very difficult problems of proof and
judgment. Thus, the possibility of prevailing by summary judg-
ment, even in a relatively clear case, is significantly diminished.180
The converse situation presents perhaps greater potential for
spurious exploitation. A defendant who has clearly infringed and
would be likely to lose a summary judgment can raise the defense
of fair use. Merely because they are "factors to be considered,"
many courts feel compelled to apply subsections one through four
at trial. Since the burden of proof on section 107(4) rests on the
(5th Cir. 1980).
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
182. See id at § 107(3).
183. See id. at § 107(4).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65; see also Chaffee, Reflections on the Law
of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 514-15 (1945).
185. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05[A](4).
186. This can be of peculiar significance in copyright actions. Consider, for example,
the successful first novelist who must defend a spurious infringement action (suppose he
quoted a couple of sentences from plaintiff's work). The author's contract with the pub-
lisher is likely to require the author to pay all costs of litigation, and to allow the publisher
to withhold royalties during litigation. If he or she cannot win on summary judgment, such
an author, even though successful, could get very hungry pendente lite, and perhaps have to
suspend work on a second novel. The author might therefore be forced to settle. But see
Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
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plaintiff, the expense of trial is likely to force an unwarranted set-
tlement rather than a disposition on the merits.187
Iowa State Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos. 88 is illustrative, with a plaintiff determined enough to pursue
its cause through trial and appeal.1 8 9 A student at Iowa State Uni-
versity had made a. film biography of a champion wrestler, the
copyright of which was held by the plaintiff; the defendant used
segments of this work in a background television film during its
coverage of the 1972 Olympic Games. The appellate court 90 ana-
lyzed the four factors of section 107 before rejecting the fair use
defense. Under prior law, the fair use defense would not have
been contemplated at all; this was a use for the same intrinsic
function as plaintiff's work and did not serve to "promote the pro-
gress of science" in an independent way. The case is notable for
its rejection of defendant's argument that it had achieved this con-
stitutional goal by increasing the dissemination of plaintiff's
work.191 The point here is that it should not have been necessary
for plaintiff to incur the expense and difficulty of this full proce-
dure. A case involving an even more egregious infringement is
Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Construction Co."92 In
1977, plaintiff, an architectural and engineering firm, had pro-
duced plans for an apartment complex built by defendant; in
1980, when defendant decided to build another such complex, it
used the same plans, a clear infringement of plaintiff's copyright.
Defendant raised the fair use defense and plaintiff won at trial. No
common law precedent vaguely supported the fair use defense in
this instance. Yet once the defense was raised, the invitation to
make the factual determinations required under subsections one
through four was compelling enough to precipitate a trial.
The problem is not in the factual nature of subsections one
through four; fair use, after all, is a question of fact."' The prob-
lem, rather, is that the factual determinations to be made under
the four factors are directed almost exclusively to the effect the
187. Mr. Wattenberg's fears may well have been justified. See supra note 151.
188. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980), affg 463 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
189. Damages awarded totaled $15,250 plus $17,500 in attorney fees. 621 F.2d at 60.
190. Id. at 60-62.
191. Id.
192. 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).
193. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d at 183; Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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defendant's second use will have upon plaintiff and plaintiff's
work. This placing of too exclusive a reliance upon these four fac-
tors results in a downplaying, even to the point of elimination, of
the value of the second work to the promotion of "the progress of
science."
At first glance it may appear that subsection 107(1), "the pur-
pose and character of the use," is directed toward the constitu-
tional purpose. However, the qualification that the court must
consider "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes" tends to belie this interpretation
by indicating the kind of purpose and character intended in the
first part of the subsection. Subsection two, "the nature of the
copyrighted work," has the least prominence in the cases. Con-
gress provided some help in the legislative history: "If the work is
'out of print' and unavailable for purchase through normal chan-
nels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it than
in the ordinary case . . "14 In most cases, however, this is not
an important consideration.
Subsection three, "the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," does
indeed spell out one of the consequences of the constitutional jus-
tification of fair use:119 copying all, or substantially all, of a copy-
righted work is, prima facie, not a fair use. The subsection is part
of a non-exclusive and non-exhaustive list 19 6 of factors to be as-
sessed in relation to each other and thus, like the common law
rule, is rebuttable. It has proven significant only in rare cases. 19,
The general recognition of subsection four as the most im-
portant of the four factors1 8 exacerbates the problem. Its promi-
nence carries at least two important dangers. First, the harm that
plaintiff suffers from defendant's use is, at least potentially, repre-
sentable in dollar figures. Quantitative data of this kind is very
194. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 64. This factor is, however, of considera-
ble importance in the Betamax decision. See infra note 297.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 125-44.
196. The use of the words "shall include" before subsections one through four un-
equivocally indicates Congress's intent that the list be non-exhaustive. Section 101 of the
1976 Copyright Act includes the stipulation: "The terms 'including' and 'such as' are illus-
trative and not limitative." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
197. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 524 F. Supp. 252
(D. Neb. 1982); Key Maps v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
198. 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05[A](4); Walker, supra note 130, at 751.
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persuasive, especially in the face of something so nebulous and un-
quantified as an increment in "the progress of science." Conse-
quently, there will be a tendency to overvalue this data, and per-
haps even to preclude the possibility of a fair use holding if any
such harm is shown.
The second danger is interrelated. Subsection four focuses on
the potential rather than the historical "market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 191 In DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,200
defendant, a chain of comic-book shops, had used pictures of
plaintiff's.comic characters Batman and Green Arrow in its adver-
tising flyers. The trial court found that plaintiff had shown no
damage and thus granted defendant's fair use claim. The appeals
court reversed because, inter alia, "one of the benefits of owner-
ship of copyrighted material is the right to license its use for a
fee."2"1 Very few second uses are not, at least potentially, subject
to licensing.20 2 Carried to its extreme this argument would elimi-
nate all but the most indispensable instances of fair use (e.g., book
reviews, academic work).203
It is thus clear that focusing on the four enumerated factors
of the second sentence of section 107 to the exclusion of the first
sentence's list of examples does not capture the prior judicial doc-
trine of fair use. Thus, to this extent, such a focus thwarts Con-
gress's intent. The remedy is far from obscure: the requirements
of statutory construction, the constitutional justification, and the
199. In terms of the constitutional basis of fair use, this may be a misdirected focus,
not in its being on "potential," but in its being on plaintiffs work. As the risk to be de-
fended against here is of damage to the economic incentive to authors, attention should be
directed to the impact on the incentive to authors (generally) of works of the same kind as
plaintiff's. See supra text accompanying note 138.
200. 539 F. Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982) (the "Bat-
man v. Batcave" case).
201. D.C. Comics, 696 F.2d at 28.
202. In Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided
Court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), the
fact that Jack Benny had previously obtained a consensual license for a radio parody of the
plaintiff's movie must have had some influence. Even parodies can be licensed.
203. The extreme has been approached in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase
Atlanta Cooperative Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979), in which the fair use de-
fense was denied to the musical stage show "Scarlet Fever," featuring such characters as
"Shady Charlotte 0' Mara" and "Brett Studler." The court found that it was not a parody
of plaintiffs Gone with the Wind and that the plaintiff might want to license such a stage
show in the future. Perhaps Georgia is not a "world of unrelieved solemnity" like New
York. See Elsemere Music, Inc., 623 F.2d at 253.
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effectuation of Congress's intention to preserve the judicial doc-
trine of fair use all make section 107's first sentence indispensable.
C. A Comprehensive Model of Section 107
Accordingly, an adequate evaluation of a fair use defense will
require a two-tier analysis. The first test is in the list of purposes
in the first sentence of section 107: is the work containing the
claimed fair use of a kind contemplated therein? Only if the an-
swer is in the affirmative is the application of the numbered crite-
ria of the second sentence of section 107 justifiable. 20 4
Exactly how this first tier test is to be applied is not immedi-
ately clear. If the defendant's use is in "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching. . . scholarship, or research" there will be no
difficulty.20 5 If the defendant's work does not fit within one of the
specific listed categories, 206 then it remains to be determined
whether or not the work fits within the general class of works of
which the list is illustrative.207 The rule of statutory interpretation
known as ejusdem generis2 8 guides this determination. "Under the
rule of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumera-
tion of specific items, the general words are read as applying to
other items akin to those specifically enumerated. ' 20 9 The rule is
''no more than an aid to construction and comes into play only
when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular
clause . -"210 These conditions seem amply satisfied here. How-
ever, the rule of ejusdem generis begs the question; what does it
204. Seltzer treats the list of examples in the first sentence of section 107 as irrelevant
(or worse); see L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 19, 21.
205. "[F]or purposes such as criticism, comment, news, reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
206. There may, of course, be a question as to whether defendant's work is genuinely
what he or she claims it to be. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
207. It is not necessary to answer how the boundaries of that are class determined. A
court faces only the easier task of deciding whether the particular use before it is in or not
in the class. As with all such concepts clearer, yet always imprecise, boundaries develop as
decisions accumulate.
208. Professor Nimmer raised the question of the application of this rule in his com-
ments on the 1964 Copyright Revision Bill. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-PART 5, 89TH
CONG., lsr SEss., 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS, 315-16 (Comm. Print
1965).
209. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980). See also United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1980).
210. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581; see Harrison 446 U.S. at 588.
304 [Vol. 33
FAIR USE AFTER BETAMAX
mean for "other items" to be "akin to those specifically enumer-
ated"? What are the determinants of kinship?
The list itself and its elaboration in the legislative history211
contain the key. Both the list of purposes in the first sentence of
section 107 and its elaboration in the legislative history have two
striking and expectable features: all the items mentioned are typi-
cally of uses of part, but not all, of the primary work, and all the
items mentioned are uses for purposes different from the purpose
of the primary work.212 Thus, the list of examples generates the
two prima facie rules required by the constitutional analysis of fair
use-rules which are satisfied in almost all pre-statute cases.2 13
In the list of examples in the first sentence of section 107,
Congress has provided a set of categories of works which one can
expect to "promote the progress of science" in a manner different
from that of the primary use. The list is not exhaustive, but a
defendant who claims a fair use of a kind not included in the list
should have the burden of establishing that it does indeed satisfy
this requirement.
There are cases which do not at first sight appear to fit this
pattern. Such a case is Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House,214 which predates the 1976 Copyright Act. Defendant's
work was a 304-page biography of a wealthy recluse, "Howard
Hughes-A Biography by John Keats," published in 1966. The
book included "[t]wo direct quotations and one eight-line para-
phrase ' 215 from plaintiff's series of three magazine articles enti-
tled "The Howard Hughes Story," published in Look magazine in
1954. Plaintiff had been organized for the purpose of buying the
copyrights to these articles and therewith preventing the publica-
tion of defendant's work. The district court had granted a prelim-
211. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 65. Note that Congress includes parody or
burlesque in its examples of fair use of copyrighted works. See 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT,
supra note 28, at 24. They are omitted, however, from the first sentence of section 107. See
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). For a recent discussion of the fair use defense in parody cases, see
Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use After Betamax, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1395 (1984).
212. It is not difficult to come up with counter-examples to the latter. For instance, a
literary critic might quote from a critical work of another literary critic. Such counter-
examples, however, are essentially trivial.
213. See supra notes 125-44 and accompanying text.
214. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
215. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 306.
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inary injunction against publication."a6 The works were of the
same kind-popular biography-and thus defendant's work
served the same intrinsic function as plaintiff's work. The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed,217 reasoning that "balancing the
equities" mandated that "the public interest should prevail over
the possible damage to the copyright owner. "218
Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt,"" decided under the 1976 Copyright
Act provisions, is another pertinent example. Pruitt was the Fire
Marshall of Harris County, Texas. He had an engineer draw fire
zones onto one of plaintiff's "major thoroughfare" maps to direct
the responsibilities of the different fire departments. Plaintiff
agreed to produce two hundred of the maps within ten days. Af-
ter six weeks the project was not complete, so defendant made
three hundred copies himself and distributed them as necessary.
This second use was not only for the same intrinsic function as
plaintiff's copyrighted work, it also was a copying of the entire
primary work. Yet, the court found for the Fire Marshall: 220
After balancing the exclusive rights of the copyright holder, Key Maps, with
the public's interest in disseminating the maps to the various fire depart-
ments for fire prevention purposes, the Court opines that a privilege is cre-
ated in the Defendants to use the copyrighted maps in a reasonable manner
without the express consent of the Plaintiff.22" '
These are both variations on what might be called a "dog in
the manger" theme.222 If the defendant's use is for the same in-
trinsic purpose, or is a complete, or essentially complete, copying
of plaintiff's work, and thus promotes the progress of science in
216. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
217. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 303. The concurring judges noted their agreement with
the fair use analysis of the majority opinion, but focused on the behavior of the plaintiff.
An injunction is an equitable remedy and thus is not available to one who has not done
equity. Note that although fair use is called "an equitable rule," see, e.g., 1975 SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 62, considerations of equity are not usually prominent in the cases.
In the Rosemont concurrence their importance was keyed to the remedy sought-Howard
Hughes was not interested in damages.
218. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 309.
219. 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
220. This must have been a close case, especially in view of the ease with which actual
historical damages could have been calculated. The point here is the deliberate judicial
overriding of the prima facie rules because of the public purpose-a purpose which must
be unique in copyright law.
221. Key Maps, 470 F. Supp. at 38.
222. See, e.g. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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the same way, a fair use might still be found if (a) the plaintiff
would not or could not use his or her work to same effect as has
the defendant, and (b) the harm to plaintiff is minimal. If a second
use does achieve the constitutional purpose of promoting the pro-
gress of science, and if the circumstances of the use are so distin-
guishable from those of other cases that it would be "mechanical
jurisprudence" to be bound by the rules developed in those cases,
then why deny society the benefit of the use when the cost to the
plaintiff is trivial? Howard Hughes did not want to exploit his bi-
ography himself; he wanted to keep it from being published. Since
Key Maps did not-as it should have-perform when the public
interest (in fire safety) was so vital, it should not have complained
when defendant subsequently responded to the need in Key Map's
stead by making the copies. Cases like Key Maps, however, are
rare. The conditions for finding fair use in such cases must be
stringent, lest rulings like Key Maps too easily engulf both fair use
and copyright.
Except under these exceptional circumstances, a second use
of copyrighted material must, if it is to qualify as a possible fair
use, be for a purpose different from that of the first use and be
such as will independently further the constitutional purpose of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. Only if the
work in question satisfies this requirement will it be appropriate to
look to the other side of the balance: the impact of the second use
on authors' incentives as measured by the detriment to the copy-
right owner's monopoly. This other side of the balance is the
principal focus of subsections one through four of section 107.223
Viewed from this perspective, Congress's intention to "endorse
the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use,
...not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way, "224 is ex-
pressed adequately in section 107. Congress did indeed succeed in
its aim. However, effectuating that success requires that serious
attention be paid to the entire section and that significant use be
223. The legislative history refers to this balancing as a balancing of equities:
On the other hand, the courts have evolved a set of criteria which, though in
no case definitive or determinative, provide some gauge for balancing the equi-
ties. These criteria have been stated in various ways, but essentially they can all
be reduced to the four standards which have been adopted in section 107.
1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 65.
224. Id. at 66.
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made of each part. Using only the four factors of the second sen-
tence of section 107 leads to results demonstrably at odds with
Congress's stated intent.
The foregoing analysis covers the cases and the theoretical
underpinnings of fair use up until the Supreme Court's decision in
Betamax. The next section of this Article examines whether, in
this single decision, the Court has demolished the entire edifice.
III. THE Betamax CASE AND ITS IMPACT ON FAIR USE
On January 17, 1984, a slim majority of the United States
Supreme Court held in the Betamax case, inter alia, that the use of
a home video tape recorder ("VTR") for time-shifting is a fair use
and thus not an infringement of copyright. 25
Time-shifting with a VTR typically involves one hundred per-
cent copying and use for the same intrinsic purpose as the primary
work. Insofar as time-shifting serves to promote the progress of
science, it does so only by increasing the dissemination of the pri-
mary work. It is thus in violation of the two prima facie rules of
the judicial doctrine and its codification in section 107.
Clearly, then, the Supreme Court's opinion in Betamax
presents some problems for the model of fair use analysis set forth
in Parts I and II above. Does the opinion revise traditional fair
use analysis? Does it render the model presented above entirely
obsolete? Can the view of the Supreme Court majority be recon-
ciled with this model?22
Before Betamax, the Supreme Court had never given its opin-
ion on a question of fair use.227 Thus, there is no prior authority
of similar weight to help answer the questions above. The prob-
lem is further exacerbated by the fact that the dissenting opinion,
for the most part, follows exactly the model presented in Parts I
and II above. Thus, maintaining the viability of the model appears
to be a problem of reconciling the majority and dissenting
opinions.
225. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 789-96.
226. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, thinks it cannot. "It is my view that the Court's
approach alters dramatically the doctrines of fair use and contributory infringement as
they have been developed by Congress and the courts .... [T]he decision today erodes
much of the coherence that these doctrines have struggled to achieve." Betamax, 104 S. Ct.
at 815.
227. See id. at 806 (Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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In this Section, the Betamax opinions will be outlined with
only marginal comments. An attempt will then be made to fit the
majority opinion into the natural development of the prior law,
and thus to bring out and ameliorate the critical points of disa-
greement in the two opinions. Since the "rule" thus developed
has great potential for overuse, an attempt will be made to delimit
clearly its domain. In conclusion, two ancillary aspects of the opin-
ions will be noted: the analysis of the burden of proof under sec-
tion 107, and the apparent invitation to Congress to modify the
Court's decision.
A. The Supreme Court Opinions
Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, White, and O'Connor), writing for the majority, re-
versed the order of argument that had become typical in the com-
mentaries and in the briefs. Plaintiffs sought no relief against any
actual users of VTRs;228 defendants, who were manufacturers and
suppliers of VTRs, could be liable, if at all, only on a theory of
contributory infringement.22 9 The theory of contributory in-
fringement has been better developed in the law of patents230
than it has in the law of copyright. In patent law and now, clearly,
in copyright law if there is a substantial noninfringing use for the
device, then there is no contributory infringement. "[T]he sale of
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."23 The
228. See id., at 785.
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., H. FORMAN, PATENTS, RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 378-86 (1961); R.
HOAR, PATENT TACTICS AND LAW § 14-10 (1950); Lourie, Contributory and Active Inducement
of Infringement in Wake of Rohm and Hass Company v. Dawson Chemical Company, in IN-
FRINGEMENT OF PATENTS 165 (1981) (Practising L. Inst., Course Handbook Series, No. 132).
The Supreme Court opinions agree as to most of this aspect of copyright law and have
provided it with a clear articulation not before available.
231. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 789. Notice that the dissent essentially agreed: "If virtually
all of the product's use. . . is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed; if no one
would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer
is purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropriately imposed."
Id. at 814. However, the dissent then reversed its emphasis: "The key question is not the
amount of television programming that is copyrighted, but rather the amount of VTR
usage that is infringing." Id. Given the facts before the court, this should not have made a
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issue thus is whether or not there is a substantial noninfringing
use for VTRs.
In Betamax it was not necessary to decide how great a use had
to be before a court would consider it to be substantial; the facts
before the Court revealed that the predominant use to which
owners put their VTRs was time-shifting.23 2 Time-shifting was
carefully defined as "the practice of recording a program to view
it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it." '233 The critical
question thus becomes whether or not time-shifting is an infringe-
ment of copyright. It is important to note that with respect to cop-
yright infringement the majority opinion addressed no other
question.
Some owners of copyrights in works broadcast on television
have no objection to, and even welcome, time-shifting. 34 Accord-
ingly, time-shift copying of those works is not an infringement.23
On this point the dissent may well have been right in asserting
that the majority confused liability and remedy,2 36 but this part of
the argument is of no relevance to the issue at hand. What is criti-
cal is the majority's finding that time-shifting by VTR is a fair
use. 
2 37
Justice Stevens begins the fair use analysis with the four enu-
merated factors of section 107.238 The first factor, subsection one,
glossed as "the commercial or nonprofit character of the activ-
ity," 23 9 is of discriminatory importance. If the second use is for
commercial purposes it is "presumptively an unfair exploita-
tion,' 240 and the burden will be on the defendant to show that the
copyright owner suffers no harm or potential harm.241 If, on the
other hand, the second use is noncommercial, the burden is on
difference.
232. Id. at 779. Throughout this opinion, Justice Stevens took great care to address
factual questions solely on the basis of the facts found at trial.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 789-91.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 791-95.
238. See id. at 792-93.
239. Id. at 792 (borrowing language from the 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at
66).
240. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 793. For an economic justification of this basic distinction,
see Cirace, supra note 52.
241. Id.
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the copyright owner to prove "either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would ad-
versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." '242
In this case "the District Court's findings plainly establish that
time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a non-
commercial, nonprofit activity.
243
This, ultimately, was where the plaintiffs failed. They con-
vinced neither the trial judge (whose responsibility it was to make
this factual determination) nor a majority of the Supreme Court
that time-shifting caused them actual or potential harm.244 Thus,
under subsection four, "respondents failed to carry their burden
with regard to home time-shifting.
245
With respect to subsections two and three, Justice Stevens
wrote:
[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work
and that timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he
had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the
entire work is reproduced does not have its ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use.2 "
For present purposes, this is the most crucial sentence in the ma-
jority opinion. What, for example, is the distinguishing "nature of
a televised copyrighted audiovisual work?"
The majority addressed-but did not emphasize-the consti-
tutional purpose element of the fair use balance. 4 7 The Court
recognized that the only conceivable benefit to the promotion of
the "progress of science" accruing from the use of VTRs is the
increased dissemination of the copyrighted work. "[T]o the extent
time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television
programs, it yields societal benefits."2 48 In this way, a majority of
the Court was able to find that home time-shifting is fair use, not
an infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights: "When these factors are
all weighed in the 'equitable rule of reason' balance, we must con-
clude that this record amply supports the District Court's conclu-
242. Id.
243. Id. at 792.
244. Id. at 793.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 792-93 (citations omitted) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(2), (3) (1982)).
247. See id. at 795.
248. Id.
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sion that home time-shifting is fair use."249 Reiterating the factual
and statutory bases of its decision, the majority invited Congress
to address the phenomenon of VTR usage.26 0
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and
Rehnquist, in dissent, followed a more conventional analytic ap-
proach. The first question Blackmun addressed was whether home
use of a VTR is copying under section 106 of the 1976 Copyright
Act; only after a determination is made that VTR usage is copying
must the issue of fair use arise, and only on resolving the fair use
question in the negative does the opinion reach the issue of con-
tributory infringement.
The question of whether or not home copying by VTR is
copying arose in the literature-and in the district court opin-
ion 5 1-because in the legislative history of the 1971 Sound Re-
cording Amendment 252 there was an apparent acceptance of an
exemption for home tape recording of audio broadcast copy-
righted work. 253 The argument was never very convincing, espe-
cially as the critical portions of that legislative history were not
incorporated into the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright
Act.254 Justice Blackmun thus accurately concluded that no "im-
plied exemption" under section 106 was applicable "to cover the
home taping of television programs, whether it be for a single
copy, for private use, or for home use." '255 There is no reason to
believe that the majority would disagree. 256
249. Id.
250.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology,
just as it has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to
apply laws that have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute, as it
now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in this case, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
Id.
251. See 480 F. Supp. at 444-46.
252. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 417.
253. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1566, 1572 (1971); Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and
H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23
(1971).
254. See 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 41, § 13.05[F](5).
255. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 805-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
256. This is one of the many indications that Justice Blackmun's opinion was originally
written for a majority. Presumably, as a majority opinion, it would have had to address the
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The dissent's treatment of fair use follows the model outlined
in Parts I and II above very closely. The "common theme" of the
listed items, Justice Blackmun wrote, is that "each is a productive
use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond that
produced by the first author's work. '2 57 Following Seltzer,2 58 Jus-
tice Blackmun characterized this as a dual-risk approach, and
stated it accurately in terms of authors' incentives.2 59 The' opinion
then addressed the two prima facie rules developed above.260
"[W]hen a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its origi-
nal purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of
fair use usually does not apply. There is no need whatsoever to
provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's
expense."26 1 Nor did it matter to Justice Blackmun that the origi-
nal television program was distributed free of direct charge; by
analogy, "a book borrowed from the public library may not be
copied any more freely than a book that is purchased.
26 2
Justice Blackmun then turned to the four enumerated factors
of section 107, beginning with subsection four-the one that he
called "perhaps the most important."26 3 He placed heavy empha-
sis on the potential effect of the second use in question.264 Critical
in the assessment of the potential harm is the nature and alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. In this respect, the dissent would dif-
ferentiate productive and non-productive second uses: when the
question of such an implied exception, as it had been raised in the briefs and resolved
wrongly by the district court.
257. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 807-08.
258. L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 28.
259.
The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by
the copying system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly
will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting authors a
complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others.
Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here Justice Blackmun quotes in a
footnote the famous passage from Sayre v. Moore, (K.B. 1785) (Mansfield, C.J.), 1 East
358, 361 n.(b), 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b) (1801). See supra note 141.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 132.
261. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The only exceptions ac-
knowledged are the de minimis examples. See also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
262. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 806.
264. Section four addresses "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982). In quoting it, Justice Blackmun
italicized "potential." See Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 809.
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second use is not a productive one, the burden remains on the
plaintiff, but it is a burden to "prove only a potential for harm to
the market for or value of the copyrighted work."265 How light
this burden may be is then shown by a discussion of possible harm.
Although there may not be any actual harm demonstrated at
trial, the fair use defense should fail if there is a "reasonable pos-
sibility" of such harm.266 Although the Betamax dissent discussed
plaintiffs' showing of potential harm, this discussion was not ad-
dressed specifically to time-shifting as defined by the majority. 6 7
The dissent also argued that time-shifting could reduce rerun
audiences, and "consequently the license fees available to [the
copyright owners] for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers
may be willing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they
believe VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services
are unable to measure VTR use ... ,,268 The dissent believed,
therefore, that the plaintiffs had irrefutably sustained this burden.
"The Studios have demonstrated a potential for harm, which has
not been, and could not be, refuted at this early stage of techno-
logical development.) 269
The dissent makes clear what would be required of defen-
dants to refute this demonstration of potential harm. "[T]he in-
fringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright
holder's ability to demand compensation from (or deny access to)
265. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). Note
that this is not wholly consistent with the argument made in a later section of the dissent-
ing opinion that the rule against fair use for nonproductive second uses is absolute except
in de minimis cases. See also infra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
266. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267. The dissent explained that "[t]ime-shifting may raise the potential for substantial
harm as well." Id. at 810. This damage was said to arise from "[a] VTR owner who has
taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing ... " Id. at 810 n.35 (emphasis added). The
majority did not address this issue.
268. Id. The rerun argument is truly baffling: Does a smaller first run audience mean
a larger rerun audience? Do unpopular programs do better on reruns than popular pro-
grams? With respect to ratings, it was noted both by the district court, 480 F. Supp. at 441,
466, and by the majority. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 794 n.36, that ratings services can account
for time-shifting. Whether time-shifters delete advertisements in significant numbers is a
factual question; the survey data presented at trial indicated: "According to plaintiff's sur-
vey, 58.3% of the owners eliminate commercials from the recording either 'sometimes,'
'rarely,' or 'never'; 56.1% use the fast-forward to pass commercials either 'sometimes,'
'rarely,' or 'never.'" 480 F. Supp. at 439.
269. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Cirace, supra note
52, at 663-67, 669-71, 682.
314 [Vol. 33
1984] FAIR USE AFTER BETAMAX
any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear
the copyrighted work. '27 0 This is a very extreme statement of the
argument made in the "Batman v. Batcave" case27 1 and criticized
above 27 1 If taken at face value, it would eliminate at least parody
and burlesque from the list of traditional areas of fair use. The
dissent argued that the Betamax defendants had failed to meet this
requirement because the fact that home VTR users pay for the
machines and video tapes demonstrates that they would be willing
to pay a royalty for the privilege of time-shifting.
Justice Blackmun would reject per se any argument to the ef-
fect that increasing dissemination of a work is favorable to a copy-
right defendant. "[T]he fact that a given market for a copyrighted
work would not be available to the copyright holder were it not
for the infringer's activities does not permit the infringer to ex-
ploit that market without compensating the copyright holder. ' 27 3
This, too, was an important point of disagreement with the
majority.
The dissent concluded that it would remand the case to the
district court for a determination of the " 'percentage of legal ver-
sus illegal home-use recording.' ",274 It, too, invited Congressional
action.27 5
270. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
271. DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra text
accompanying note 200.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 200-03.
273. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Iowa State Univ. Re-
search Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)). See supra text
accompanying notes 188-91.
274. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 815 (quoting the district court's opinion, 480 F. Supp. at
468).
275. See Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 819. One ought not finish a discussion of the Supreme
Court opinions in Betamax without acknowlegement of the remarkable analysis of one stu-
dent commentator; see Note, supra note 110. In this note, the author divides second uses
on two different dimensions: "interactive" (corresponding to productive) versus "iterative"
(unproductive, serving the same intrinsic purpose), and "commercial" versus "noncommer-
cial." The thesis is that only the iterative-commercial group should not be considered as
possible fair uses. See id. at 462-63. The major difficulty is with the iterative-noncommercial
group-and here the author's argument is, ultimately, not convincing. However, the arti-
cle is interesting in that it foreshadowed both of the Supreme Court opinions. The major-
ity took the commercial-noncommercial dimension as fundamental, and the dissent took
the iterative-interactive dimension as such.
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B. The Betamax Decision and Prior Law
Two cases discussed earlier 7 are of special value in relating
the Betamax decision to prior case law: Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc.,277 a case decided before enactment of the
1976 Copyright Act, and Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt,2 7s a case decided
under section 107. The holdings of both these cases are inconsis-
tent with the analysis of the Betamax dissent.2 7
First, in both cases the second use in question was for the
same intrinsic purpose as the first use. In Rosemont, the defen-
dant's biography was for the popular market, as were plaintiff's
Look magazine articles.280 In Key Maps, the defendant used plain-
tiff's map as a map, albeit modified, but in exactly the manner that
plaintiff had agreed to supply.2 " Confronted with an absolute, per
se rule against non-productive second uses such as that advocated
by the Betamax dissent,282 neither the Rosemont nor the Key Maps
defendant could have successfully invoked the fair use defense.
In both Rosemont and Key Maps plaintiffs could have de-
manded compensation for the defendant's uses or denied access to
their originals.28 3 Indeed, in Key Maps compensation had previ-
ously been agreed to, and in Rosemont denying access was the
whole point of plaintiff's action. Thus, under the principles advo-
cated by the Betamax dissent, plaintiffs were clearly harmed, and
thus under subsection four of section 107 the fair use defense
would be denied. Moreover, in Key Maps not only was the defen-
dant's use for the same intrinsic purpose, it was a use of one-hun-
dred percent of plaintiff's original. Under the absolute, per se rule
against one-hundred percent second uses that the dissent pro-
276. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text.
277. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
278. 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 214-22.
280. See Rosemont, 336 F.2d at 306.
281. See Key Maps, 470 F. Supp. at 37.
282. See Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 807-08, 816. It is useful here to adopt the distinction
used in antitrust law between a per se rule (one which applies regardless of the relation of
the particular facts to the rationale of the rule) and a rule of reason (one which applies only
in case the particular facts accord with the rule's rationale). See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The use of this distinction in copyright law has been
advocated in Phelan, The Continuing Battle with the Performing Rights Societies: The Per Se Rule,
the Rule of Reason Standard, and Copyright Misuse, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 349 (1984).
283. Cf Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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poses,2 4 the defendant therefore could not succeed in the fair use
defense. Finally, in both cases the markets satisfied by the defen-
dants' second uses could not have had access to the primary works
but for the claimed infringement. This, too, would have been
ruled irrelevant in the view of the Betamax dissent.2"'
The Betamax majority, on the other hand, portrays fair use as
an "equitable rule of reason" ' 6 and as being founded upon "a sen-
sitive balancing of interests. 287 It thus rejects any attempt to in-
troduce absolute, per se rules into the analysis.
The majority, nevertheless, does not neglect the "prima fa-
cie" rules developed above. First, as to the prohibition against
non-productive second uses, the majority wrote:
The distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be
helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative. Al-
though copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger
claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the ques-
tion is not simply two-dimensional .... [T]he notion of social "productiv-
ity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis.
288
As the majority pointed out, Congress itself provided a counter-
example to the absoluteness of this rule: "Making a copy of a
copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is ex-
pressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose
to entertain or inform need motivate the copying."28 9 Applying
this reasoning to the Rosemont and Key Maps cases establishes
clearly that defendants would not fail solely because their second
uses were for a purpose not intrinsically different from the plan-
tiffs' primary works.
Second, as to the prohibition against one-hundred percent
copying, the majority wrote:
[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work,. . . and that timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work
which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact
that the entire work is reproduced .. .does not have its ordinary effect of
284. See id. at 807-08, 816.
285. See id. at 811.
286. See id. at 792 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 795 & n.40. The Court explains in terms of "[w]hen these factors are all
weighed in the 'equitable rule of reason' balance . Id. at 795.
288. Id. at 795.
289. Id. The reference is to 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 73.
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militating against a finding of fair use.290
Distinguishing between time-shifting of "televised copyrighted au-
diovisual works" and ordinary one-hundred percent copying is
thus of critical importance to determining the effect of the major-
ity position.
In the passage quoted above, the majority mentioned one dis-
tinguishing feature: the fact that the person who time-shifts has
previously been offered the work "in its entirety free of charge."
This fact did not obtain in Key Maps; indeed, defendant had previ-
ously agreed to buy the maps from plaintiff.291 Even had he not so
agreed, he could easily have bought three hundred of the basic
maps and modified each rather than copying his own modification
of one.292
The second fact emphasized by the Betamax majority as distin-
guishing time-shifting from "ordinary copying" was that time-
shifting is "a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. ' 293 Although the
greatest impact of this may be with respect to the allocation of the
burden of proof, under subsection four it is also relevant as a dis-
tinguishing factor. The dissent takes issue with it as such.
"[T]ime-shifting is noncommercial in the same sense that stealing
jewelry and wearing it-instead of reselling it-is noncommer-
cial." ' 29 4 This misses the point: the time-shifter, unlike the jewel
thief, deprives the owner of nothing.
It is difficult to characterize Fire Marshall Pruitt's activity in
Key Maps within this commercial/noncommercial dimension. Cer-
tainly his copying was for a public purpose, not for private gain;
on the other hand, he did deprive Key Maps of the profit obtaina-
ble from the market demand he filled. Probably the latter is the
more serious aspect, as it pertains to the incentive side of the con-
stitutional balance. Under the reasoning of the Betamax majority
this factor, too, should have influenced the Court not to hold that
Pruitt's use was fair.
290. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 792-93 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
291. Key Maps, 470 F. Supp. at 36-38.
292. The Betamax dissent rejected the relevance of this fact. "Although a television
broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from
the public library may not be copied any more freely than a book that is purchased."
Betarax, 104 S. Ct. at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 792.
294. Id. at 816-17. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The fact that the Betamax plaintiffs failed to show any reduc-
tion in market or "meaningful likelihood of future harm"29 is
also very significant in distinguishing time-shifting. In the "ordi-
nary" case of one-hundred percent copying, the effect is almost
certainly going to be some present and demonstrable future harm
to the copyright owner. In Key Maps, the actual historical damages
were quite apparent; the possible future harm would have been,
also apparently, zero. Under the unique circumstances of the
case, 298 there could hardly be any negative impact on mapmakers'
incentives.
The final factor distinguishing time-shifting from ordinary
one-hundred percent copying is probably the most important: the
time-shifter has no other way of viewing the copyrighted materi-
als. "Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they other-
wise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with
other tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the
time of a broadcast they desire to watch. ' 297 Standing alone this
factor may not appear significant; the fact that one cannot afford
a book would not make photocopying it (should that be cheaper) a
fair use. But when conjoined with the initial free distribution and
the absence of harm to the copyright owner, the impossibility of
otherwise viewing the copyrighted work is a very powerful reason
for finding time-shifting to be fair use. This factor is critical to the
Key Maps holding; within the short time frame imposed, rein-
forced by the pressing public need for modified maps, Pruitt had
no alternative to making them himself.
It is clear that the majority in Betamax accepts both the prima
facie rules of previous fair use analysis. However, it accepts them
as "rules of reason," not as absolute or per se constraints on the
application of the doctrine of fair use. The rules can be avoided
only when the reasons upon which they are founded are not appli-
cable. Justice Stevens spells out quite explicitly the facts which
make those reasons inapplicable with respect to time-shifting.298
295. Id. at 793. See also id. at 780-81. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. The judge might well have been impressed by equitable considerations. Key
Maps had breached its contract with Pruitt, but nevertheless was seeking to collect the
profits it would have made had it performed, see 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982), or possibly
even more in statutory in lieu damages. See id. at § 504(c).
297. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 779.
298. See id. at 792-93.
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One must also address the other side of the doctrinal balance
by which the defense of fair use is weighed: the extent to which
the use achieves the constitutional purpose of promoting the pro-
gress of science. The only way time-shifting fulfills this purpose is
by increasing the dissemination of the copyrighted television
broadcasts. The argument against permitting this is closely related
to that for the prima facie rule against one-hundred percent copy-
ing. Thus, all of the features distinguishing time-shifting under
that rule are equally significant here. In particular, a noncommer-
cial second use with no "demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohib-
ited,"2  as it ipso facto would have no negative impact upon au-
thors' incentives. Rather than further the constitutional purpose
of copyright, "[t]he prohibition of such noncommercial uses
would merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit.", 00
The Betamax dissent disagreed,301 citing Iowa State University
Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.302 This reli-
ance is misplaced. In that case the defendant did argue that it had
made plaintiff's film available to millions who otherwise would not
have seen it; however, plaintiff was also actively engaged in rent-
ing the film to organizations such as schools and wrestling clubs.
Unlike the typical television broadcast, it was readily available at a
price and would continue to be so.
Had the Betamax court been confronted with slightly different
facts, the case might well have been decided differently. If, for
example, videotapes of all television programs were made availa-
ble by the networks through some rental system, or if they could
be viewed later by a selective cable system, the majority analysis
would be unjustifiable. But today's episode of "Another World" is
not available after 3:00 p.m. today (and before tomorrow's epi-
sode) by any means other than time-shifting. This is quite differ-
ent from the situation envisaged by the minority and from the
facts in Iowa State.
Key Maps is distinctive for the unique and pressing public pur-
pose of the defendant's use: firefighting. It is, nevertheless, a mar-
299. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
300. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 793.
301. Id. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 274.
302. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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ginal case. According to the reasoning of the Betamax majority,
Key Maps was correctly decided but marginally so; under the rea-
soning of the Betamax dissent, it would have been unequivocally
reversed. Rosemont is distinctive for the plaintiff's unusual motive:
the denial of access to any published material about Howard
Hughes. It, too, would have been upheld by the Betamax majority
and reversed by the dissent.
Both Betamax opinions contain the formal elements of the
model of prior fair use law outlined earlier in this Article, though
the dissent is more explicit in following them. The key difference
between the majority and dissent is in the approach to the prima
facie rules of that model. To the majority, the rules are equitable
rules of reason, to be followed when the reasons for them apply,
but not to be followed slavishly when those reasons do not apply.
To the dissent the prima facie rules are absolutes, per se rules to
be applied in all but a specified few de minimis cases.303
C. The Effect of the Betamax Decision
Thus the traditional doctrine of fair use survives the Betamax
decision relatively unscathed. What the Supreme Court has re-em-
phasized is that the analysis must be used sensibly, with sensitivity
to the facts of the particular case. The rules generated by the
analysis are rules of reason.
Insofar as it has created an exception to the model, the
Betamax opinion might best be described as anti-"dog in the man-
ger." If the second use is of some benefit to society, and if the
copyright owner is in no way harmed, actually or potentially, and
if those who benefit from the second use would not otherwise
have access to the copyrighted work, it would be foolish-indeed
counter-productive-to deny the privilege of fair use. To find a
defendant liable for infringement in such circumstances would be
to condone the plaintiff copyright owner's "dog in the manger"
behavior.
The most significant argument against this position is histori-
303. In its recent analysis of price-fixing prohibitions, the Supreme Court recently re-
iterated the reasons for adopting per se rules. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1981). ThatJustice Stevens, who authored the majority opin-
ion, was also the author of the majority opinion in Betamax, indicates how firmly the Court
holds that the prima facie rules of fair use are rules of reason, and not per se.
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cal.3 04 Three of the state statutes enacted between 1783 and
1790305 had contemplated and made provision for just such cir-
cumstances.306 The drafters of the first federal legislation, who
undoubtedly were aware of these state statutes, rejected such a
provision, and all subsequent Congressional revisions of the copy-
right statute followed suit. However, with the time that has passed
since then, and the great changes in technology and the conse-
quent increase in the variety of kinds of subject matter of copy-
right, it could hardly be said that the considerations relevant in
1790 were relevant for similar reasons in 1976. The relevance of
the historical argument is, thus, doubtful.
The "mechanical jurisprudence" of the dissenting analysis in
Betamax has the definite advantage of certainty.307 Does the major-
ity position sacrifice too much in this respect? Probably not. The
certainty required of rules is only the certainty appropriate to
their subject matter. As Justice Stevens noted, the subject matter
of the fair use doctrine is tremendously diverse.308 It would in-
deed be surprising if "the most troublesome [issue] in the whole
law of copyright"30 9 could be captured in a uniform and certain
net. To be sure, the Betamax majority has done little to further
the cause of certainty or to reduce the judicial burden in future
fair use cases, but case-by-case analysis is exactly what is appropri-
ate in the area of fair use.3 10
Since it is an apparent exception to a set of general rules, the
Betamax decision, as Justice Blackmun commented in dissent, cre-
ates some risk of "erod[ing] much of the coherence that [fair use]
304. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
305. See B. BUGBEE, supra note 16, at 104-24.
306. See supra note 131.
307. Certainty was included as Professor Chaffee's sixth criterion for copyright law.
See Chafee, supra note 184, at 514-15.
308.
[I]t is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material
with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well have a broader
claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Cop-
ying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a
motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are fungible. Copying for commer-
cial gain has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for personal
enrichment.
Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 795 n.40.
309. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). See supra text ac-
companying note 14.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
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doctrines have struggled to achieve." 3 n If the majority's rationale
is followed, there is no such risk; but there is such a risk if courts
misinterpret the majority opinion as creating a new general rule.
It would therefore be useful to find a general characterization of
"the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work" 312 that
allows time-shifting to be fair use.
Prior to the Gutenberg revolution (starting in the mid-
fifteenth century), there was no real need for copyright protection
as we know it today. 13 Writings had great longevity, but very lit-
tle distribution among the population. One might say writings
were well distributed on a diachronic dimension, but had scarcely
any distribution on a synchronic dimension. Copying by hand was
simply too onerous.3 14 A modern analogue may be found in paint-
ings or sculptures. There is little need for copyright protection of
such works in galleries unless they are mechanically copied in rep-
licas such as postcards or statuettes for wide synchronic
distribution.3 15
The typical television broadcast presents the converse. It has
very great synchronic distribution: the copyright owner hopes to
maximize his viewer audience. But it has very little diachronic dis-
tribution: once shown, it is no longer available. By way of con-
trast, a book is usually available at any time,16 either by purchase
or from a library.317 This diachronic limitation of television
broadcasts is especially relevant to serials (such as "soap operas")
which the viewer wants to see, if at all, before the next episode,
and to sports events which are not usually rerun.
311. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 815.
312. Id. at 792.
313. But see "Finnian v. Columba," in MONTALEMBERT, supra note 41.
314. Nevertheless, Columba is said to have made "with his own hand three hundred
copies of the Gospel or the Psalter." See id. at 118.
315. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (Day, Circuit Jus-
tice, 1907); Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303
(N.D. Il. 1970). Cf. Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249
(1942). This is not to say that artists' claim to greater and more equitable compensation is
without merit. See generally Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case
of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968).
316. If a book is not available, Congress tells us that the fair use privilege to copy it
may be greater. See 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 64.
317. This distinction demonstrates the inaccuracy of the parallel Justice Blackmun
drew between time-shifting and copying a book from a library. See Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at
808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Time-shifting, as defined and examined in the Betamax case, is
not a process of creating a substitute diachronic distribution; the
majority did not address the issue of program librarying. It is a
process of alleviating the very narrow diachronic distributional
constraint characteristic of the medium. 18
On this basis, one might characterize the Betamax exception
as applicable only in those instances in which the copyrighted
work has no extended distribution either on the synchronic or on
the diachronic dimension. Historically, copyright protection has
been unnecessary unless there was a possibility of extensive syn-
chronic distribution.31 9 The situations in which a copyrighted
work lacks diachronic distribution must be very rare. 20
D. Betamax and the Burden of Proof
Throughout this Article, fair use has been referred to as a
defense. It has not always been clear that it is. "Fair use has been
variously regarded as a 'defense,' as a 'privilege,' or as a use that is
noninfringing. 3 21 The two Betamax opinions alleviate any remain-
ing confusion.
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, stated explicitly that
before reaching the question of fair use one must first find the
appearance of a violation of "the exclusive right, granted in the
first instance by § 106(1) . . "..- In other words, one must first
318. Accordingly, the dissent missed the point when it referred to taping "a favorite
movie for repeated viewing ...." Id. at 810 n.35. The dissent's use of Professor Tribe's
analogy of time-shifting and "stealing jewelry and wearing it," id. at 816-17, is similarly
misguided; the appropriate analogue is to stopping and looking twice at the jewelry on the
person wearing it.
319. This was the problem in Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), and Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F.
Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978). In Rosemont, Howard Hughes could do nothing about the pub-
lished Look magazine articles, but wanted to prevent any further synchronic distribution of
material about him. In Key Maps, the plaintiff had, within the short time-frame required by
the important public purpose, prevented the synchronic distribution needed.
320. It follows, as it should, that if television programs were to be made available
diachronically, by some means such as were suggested above, see supra text accompanying
note 302, time-shifting would no longer be fair use.
It should be noted that this distinction also removes the Betamax decision from the
scope of the historical criticism. See supra text accompanying notes 305-07. The state legis-
latures in 1783-1790 and the first Congress were (and could only be) addressing problems
in the synchronic dimension.
321. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1626 (footnotes omitted).
322. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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find the appearance of an infringement . 23 The majority did not
disagree; rather, it assumed that this rather obvious requirement
had been satisfied.2 4
If the plaintiff can establish copying, he or she hardly can be
expected or required further to allege and demonstrate, prima fa-
cie, facts sufficient to show that none of sections 107 through 118
apply. These issues are to be raised at the defendant's discretion.
Thus, fair use arises in litigation as an affirmative defense.
Common sense and procedure permit no other stance. It would
appear to follow that "[i]f fair use is viewed as a defense, or a
form of excused infringement, the burden of proof lies with the
defendant. '" 25 But one should not reach hasty conclusions on
mere appearances. As Congress noted, "any special statutory pro-
vision placing the burden of proving fair use on one side or other
would be unfair and undesirable. 3 26
The allocation of burden of proof should vary with the differ-
ent elements of the fair use defense. 27 If the burden were on de-
fendant to show that plaintiff suffers no potential harm under sub-
section four, defendant will, in discovery, ascertain and refute all
of the ways in which plaintiff thinks he or she may be harmed,
thus shifting the burden back to plaintiff. Courts should not re-
quire such gratuitous formalities.
If defendant's use is of a kind listed in the first sentence of
section 107,28 he or she should have the benefit of a presumption
that the use promotes the progress of science; so Congress seems
to have intended. Plaintiff then has the burden of rebuttal. 329 If
323. Section 501(a) defines infringement of copyright as the violation of "the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118" of the 1976
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
324. One must take care not to confuse the issues of copying and fair use. See Betamax,
104 S. Ct. at 777-78.
325. Marsh, supra note 56, at 57.
326. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1967). Marsh notes this but con-
cludes that because Congress did not intend to change the prior law of fair use, the burden
remains on the defendant. Marsh, supra note 56, at 57. It is questionable that the prior law
was so unequivocal.
327. Should a formal argument be required one could note that section 106 is
"[s]ubject to sections 107 through 118." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Thus, there appears to be
a standoff between arguments for putting the burden on the plaintiff or the defendant.
Common sense and reality should prevail.
328. This should include its expansion (in particular to cover parody) in the legislative
history. See supra text accompanying note 28.
329. Plaintiff's rebuttal succeeded, for example, in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180
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defendant's work is not on that list, he or she should have the
burden of showing that, nevertheless, it does achieve this constitu-
tional end. s33
The critical issue-the issue on which the outcome of an ac-
tion may very well hinge-is the burden of proof of "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work" under subsection four. The statute does not clarify how
courts should treat this issue, which hitherto has been the subject
of much debate." 1 The Supreme Court in Betamax has resolved
this dilemma.
A reasonable first reaction to this question is that the burden
must be on plaintiff, since the facts and the imaginative incentive
for such a proof are peculiar to him or her. Congress accepted
this reasoning in its enactment of the first sale doctrine.332 Previ-
ously, the burden had been on plaintiff to prove, in those in-
stances in which he or she claimed not to have sold any copies of
the copyrighted work, that "the allegedly infringing copies
in the defendant's possession were not lawfully made or ac-
quired . . . .- 3
The Committee believes that the court's decision, if followed, would place a
virtually impossible burden on copyright 6wners. The decision is also incon-
sistent with the established legal principle that the burden of proof should
not be placed upon a litigant to establish facts particularly within the knowl-
edge of his adversary.38
So also it appears to be with subsection four.33
The Supreme Court did not disagree; rather, it refined this
allocation of the burden of proof with a precondition.
[A]lthough every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
(2d Cir. 1981).
330. Professor Gordon would place this burden on the defendant regardless of
whether the work is of a kind on section 107's list. Gordon, supra note 52, at 1625.
331. Id. at 1624.
332. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
333. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 80-81 (referring to American Int'l Pic-
tures, Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975) rev'd 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.
1978)).
334. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 81.
335. Congress, however, despite a clear opportunity to do so, did not make this argu-
ment with respect to subsection 107(4). Perhaps this is because it addressed the question of
burden of proof only as to section 107 as a whole and not as to its subparts. Note that in
this respect subsection 107(4) is different from the remainder of section 107. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1982).
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unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of
the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the par-
ticular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would ad-
versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. . . If the in-
tended use is for commercial gain, [the likelihood of future harm] may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated. 38
Thus, the burden of proof is on plaintiff, but if the use in question
is commercial, plaintiff has the benefit of a presumption of harm
satisfying subsection four.33 7
The Betamax dissent was consistent with this approach, but it
would gear the burden of proof to whether or not the defendant's
use was productive, lightening the burden when it is not. As Jus-
tice Blackmun would have it, "at least when the proposed use is an
unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a potential
for harm to the market for or the value of the copyright work." 8 '
This is apparently inconsistent with the elevation of the rule
against fair use for nonproductive uses to per se status. 39 Never-
theless, it does not necessarily negate the majority position. If the
second use is nonproductive (in the dissent's sense) but is within
the Betamax rule-of-reason exception, the same rule will apply,
subject only to the commercial/noncommercial refinement. The
burden remains, mostly, on the plaintiff.
How heavy is that burden? The Supreme Court majority
answered:
336. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 793 (emphasis added). The use of the words "should it
become widespread" plainly accommodates both the de minimis cases, see id. at 793 n.34,
and Congress's express fear: "Isolated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied
many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be pre-
vented." 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 65.
337. This position is supported by Cirace's analysis. He argues that as long as the re-
production is not commercial, out of pocket and opportunity costs will always outweigh
gain. Cirace, supra note 52, at 661-62. .He argues further that a repayment to copyright
owners by way of a tax or such like would not necessarily be to their benefit and could have
an undesirable impact on their production patterns. Id. at 670-71. His analysis reminds us
that externalities of both consumption and production are two-way streets. Note also that
the majority's position quoted here would not have affected the outcome of Triangle Publi-
cations, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980).
338. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). This
may apper to take something away from the copyright owner, as subsection 107(4) refers to
"potential" in all cases.
339. See supra text accompanying note 303.
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Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the
copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it nec-
essary to show with certainty that future harm will result. What is necessary
is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm exists.30
The dissent substituted "reasonable possibility" for "meaningful
likelihood. 3 41 The dissent's elaboration of this difference reveals
that it intends plaintiff's burden to be extremely light.3 42 Perhaps
"'meaningful likelihood" is vague; could it be otherwise? The
Betamax majority has indicated what it means by its treatment of
the plaintiff's attempted proofs; the contrast with the dissent view
highlights this meaning.
In summary, the burden of proof of fair use is divided in a
reasonable and sensible manner between plaintiff and defendant.
With respect to the critical problem of subsection four, the bur-
den is on plaintiff, but the plaintiff has the benefit of a presump-
tion of harm if the defendant's use is commercial. This approach
accords with common sense and the realities of litigation.
E. The Invitation to Congress
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Betamax invited
Congress to look further at the question of home use of VTRs.843
The implication is that the Court believes Congress could, if it so
chose, change the law that decided the case. How exactly would
Congress do this?
If Congress is satisfied with copyright law as it stands after
Betamax, it will take no action, and those bills presently before
Congress3 44 that would simply exempt home video recording be-
come irrelevant. If, on the other hand, Congress decides that the
owners of copyrights in broadcast material should receive some
compensation from home video (and audio) recorders, it must
take some action.
Legislation has already been proposed which would exempt
340. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 793 (emphasis in original).
341. Id. at 809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 270-73 for an argument that the plaintiff's
burden is made so light that it destroys many valued fair uses.
343. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 796, 819.
344. E.g., S. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (the "DeConcini Bill"); H.R. 175, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (the "Foley Bill").
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home video and audio recording but charge a royalty on the sale
of VTRs and tapes, to be paid to copyright owners through the
medium of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 4 5 The proposed bills
would create a new exemption (to be section 119 of the 1976
Copyright Act) and amend section 106 to be "subject to sections
107 through 119." Clearly, such an amendment would not be
satisfactory.
Professor Seltzer has demonstrated the distinction between
exemptions and fair use. 346 Uses coming under the exemption sec-
tions341 are uses to which the copyright owner's rights do not ex-
tend; they are uses which are not within the scope of copyright
protection. Fair use, on the other hand, applies, if at all, to uses
which are within the scope of copyright protection but which are
excused; they are infringements for which the infringer is not lia-
ble. 348 The proposed amendments would create a new exemption
but with the royalty as the price therefor.
After Betamax, one can buy a VTR and video tapes to use for
time-shifting without incurring liability to any copyright owner.
By what authority can Congress impose a charge for doing
this-certainly not by the copyright clause of the Constitution;
the Supreme Court has decided that in Betamax. Nor does it seem
possible under the commerce clause or the taxing power.3 49 This
lack of regulatory authority is exacerbated by the fact that the
royalty collected would be for the benefit specifically of the copy-
345. S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Senator Mathias; captioned
"Home Recording Act of 1983"); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by
Representative Edwards, with the same caption as the Mathias Bill). The Edwards Bill, in
earlier form (H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), was expressly favored by the Register
of Copyright, Mr. David Ladd. See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 697
(1982).
346. L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 16-17. Professor Seltzer notes that the 1976 Copy-
right Act somewhat obfuscates the distinction. Id. at 17.
347. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-18 (1982).
348. L. SELTZER, supra note 10, at 16-17.
349. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 37-40 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Congress's power of taxation should be used only to raise revenue, not to regulate activi-
ties such as gambling, which are the states' concerns); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 288-89 (1936); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (one of several child-
labor tax cases). Although these cases have been largely repudiated, the analysis that taking
from one to give directly to another is not a tax survives. See Stern, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 672-73 (1946).
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right owners, and not for the public fisc.
Thus, the present proposals are inappropriate. They might be
rescued by an amendment to the fair use provision, section 107,
excluding time-shifting from fair use. Such a course would, how-
ever, have unfortunate consequences. Congress, in enacting sec-
tion 107, specifically intended to capture the prior judicial doc-
trine of fair use.3 50 The Supreme Court, superficial appearances
to the contrary notwithstanding, decided the Betamax case in ac-
cord with this design. Should Congress now specifically negate the
Supreme Court's decision by amending section 107 it would like-
wise be abrogating its clear original intent for that section. The
impact of such an action on our present understanding of the doc-
trine of fair use would be most disconcerting; the practical effect,
indeterminable.
Such a course is also unnecessary. In Betamax, the Supreme
Court decided only that time-shifting was fair use. The Court did
not reach the issue of librarying-that is, of making a copy of a
copyrighted broadcast work for repeated future viewing. As none
of the reasons which make time-shifting 51 a fair use apply to such
copying, there is no reason to believe that it is not still inexcusable
infringement. Insofar as librarying occurs, the aggrieved copy-
right owners should be compensated.
For the reasons given above, no royalty can legitimately be
charged on the sale of VTR machines themselves. Nor can a roy-
alty be charged on such video tapes as a VTR owner needs for
time-shifting. But good faith time-shifting requires very few video
tapes. Thus, an amendment such as the Home Recording Act of
198352 could be satisfactory if modified to permit the purchase of
a VTR and a specified number of hours (perhaps six) of recording
capacity free of the royalty.353 The royalty would then be assessed
only on such video tapes as the VTR owner subsequently
purchases.
As copying for librarying is not a fair use, no harm would be
done to the doctrine by imposing a royalty on the practice. It is
350. See supra text accompanying note 153.
351. Time-shifting was carefully and narrowly defined by the Betamax majority. See
Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 779.
352. S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see supra note 345 and accompanying text.
353. There would remain the problem of dealing with the legitimate needs of home-
video camera users.
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within Congress's power to exempt particular infringements from
copyright coverage and to exact a royalty as the price for so do-
ing. Such an amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act would, there-
fore, serve the legitimate interests of all parties.
CONCLUSION
In United States copyright law, a coherent doctrine of fair
use has been developing along stable lines since Folsom v. Marsh.3"
Congress succeeded in its aim of representing the judicially devel-
oped doctrine in the first statutory recognition of it: section 107
of the 1976 Copyright Act. The courts have, for the most part,
followed this statute in accord with Congressional intent. Never-
theless, failure to take full account of the language of the section
has led some courts awry.
Both the majority and the dissent in Betamax follow the tradi-
tional model of fair use as represented in section 107. They differ
only in the way in which they construe that model. To the major-
ity, fair use is an equitable rule of reason; the prima facie rules of
the model are to be applied only when the facts at hand are in
accord with the justification of those rules. To the dissent those
rules are absolutes-per se rules to be applied regardless of the
relation of the facts to their rationales. Fortunately, the majority
prevailed; fair use retains its sensible, flexible character.
Although both the majority and the dissent in Betamax invite
Congress to reexamine the issue, the opinion sets limits on what
Congress can do. Should Congress choose to act, it can do so with-
out disrupting the doctrine of fair use by creating an exemption
for noncommercial home VTR copying for librarying purposes
while not touching time-shifting itself. The price for such an ex-
emption would be a royalty on all recording capacity (that is, on
the purchase of video tapes) beyond that necessary for time-
shifting.
The developed judicial and statutory model of the fair use
doctrine remains intact after Betamax. That fair use is an equitable
rule of reason has been reemphasized; it must be applied judi-
ciously and with sensitivity to its purpose and the facts of each
case. This is no easy task, except in the most straightforward
354. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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cases; such is to be expected in a law governing such diffuse and
variegated subject matter.
